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## Improper Behavior of the Safety CPU Modules

### General

The CPU diagnostics verifies the correctness of the hardware and the running program, see *Standalone Safety CPU, page 33*. If an error is detected during 1 of the tests, the CPU enters an error state and all Safety-related outputs go to the Safe state.

### Handling Detected Errors

If a an error is detected, perform the following steps:

Step	Action
1	Power off the complete PLC.
2	Switch the power on again. <b>Result:</b> A self-test is performed.
3	Read the content of the system words %SW125, %SW126, and %SW127 for information on the detected error state, see <i>Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127, page 148</i> .
4	Provide the contents of these system words and Unity Pro project system words to Schneider Electric support.

Some of the detected errors are temporary and disappear after a restart of the PLC. Others require replacement of the CPU.

**NOTE:** If an “**Automatic Start in Run**” option for the CPU is configured (its use is not recommended in a Safety PLC) and if the diagnostic error is persistent, the CPU again enters the error state and stops.

To read the values of the system words, prevent a restart by either:

- removing the PCMCIA memory card (the application is stored on the card)
- by inserting an empty PCMCIA memory card (the application is stored in memory)

## WARNING

### UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION

Avoid using the **Automatic start in Run** option. If you use this feature, it is your responsibility to program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

---

## Content of the System Words

%SW125 contains the cause of the detected error and have the following meaning:

Code (hex)	Meaning
0x5AF1	sequence check detected error (unpredictable execution in CPU)
0x5AF2	detected error in memory (incorrect address)
0x5AF3	detected comparison error (result of the execution of the Intel processor differs from that of the application processor)
0x5AF4	real-time clock detected error
0x5AF5	detected error initializing double code execution
0x5AF6	detected watchdog activation error
0x5AF7	detected error during memory check (it takes more than 8 hours)
0x5AF8	detected error in memory check (in RAM)

%SW126 and %SW127 contain information that is for Schneider Electric internal use to analyze the problem in more detail.

---

## Improper Behavior of the Safety I/O Modules

### General

The Safety I/O modules detect an internal error in either:

- a channel
- the complete module

### Detected Channel Error

If an error is detected in a channel, this channel is set to the Safe state while the other channels continue to operate. The information about the detected error is available in the status registers of the module (see "Quantum Safety I/O Modules" in the *Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual*). Depending on the type of detected error, the complete module may have to be exchanged.

### Detected Module Error

If a module error is detected, the I/O module enters the Safe state. It then resets, restarts and performs the power up self-tests:

If the power up self-tests ...	Then the module ...
are successful	starts and operates normally.
are unsuccessful	resets and goes through the same procedure. <b>NOTE:</b> If several self-tests are unsuccessful, the module must be exchanged.

After a detected error in a Safety I/O module, it restarts automatically. If the power-up self tests are successful, the module continues normal operation, i.e., it again sets the outputs to 1. If an inoperable module has been exchanged (hot-swapped), it also automatically starts operation after the self-test. The application must be programmed and configured in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart of the Safety I/O modules.

## WARNING

### UNEXPECTED APPLICATION BEHAVIOR - AUTOMATIC RESTART


Program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after the Safety I/O modules restart.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**



---

The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:




**NOTE:** Only the Schneider Electric Safety products are certified for use in your Quantum Safety PLC and therefore for processing Safety-Related data. Non-interfering modules such as the Ethernet NOE communication module are only certified for processing non-Safety-Related data. However, they are allowed to be part of the Quantum Safety PLC because they cannot interfere with the Safety-Related System by their own means. Still, they are not allowed to execute Safety Functions. Further, you can connect other necessary devices such as human-machine interfaces (HMI). These devices are not part of the Safety loop because they are not allowed to write Safety data directly, see also *PLC-HMI Communication*, page 107.


---

### Redundant CPU Configurations for High Availability (1oo2 HotStandby system)

The following figure is an example of a Hot Standby Quantum Safety PLC consisting of redundant CPUs:




The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:



## Redundant I/O Configurations for High Availability


The following figure provides the functional overview of a redundant I/O configuration, consisting of 1 CPU and redundant I/Os:



It is possible to place your redundant Safety I/O modules

- either in the same RIO drop (not recommended)
- or in different RIO drops (recommended when redundant Safety I/O modules are used).


The following figure shows redundant I/Os placed in the same RIO drop (left) and in different RIO drops (right):




**NOTE:** Schneider Electric recommends always placing redundant Safety I/O modules in different RIO drops.

## Redundant CPU and I/O Configuration

The following figure shows an example of a Quantum Safety PLC consisting of redundant CPUs and redundant I/Os:



The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:



**NOTE:** Schneider Electric recommends always placing redundant Safety I/O modules in different RIO drops.



---

# Programming

# 3

---

## Introduction

This chapter deals with the topics important for programming your SIL3 project. The requirements for programming a Safety-Related System are described and the SIL3 features are explained.

## What's in this Chapter?

This chapter contains the following sections:

Section	Topic	Page
3.1	General Information on Programming	66
3.2	Software Description	76
3.3	Operating Procedures	84
3.4	Special Features and Procedures	93
3.5	Communication	100

---

## 3.1 General Information on Programming

---

### Introduction

This section provides general information on programming a SIL3 application with regard to programming and monitoring requirements.

### What's in this Section?

This section contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
Available Language Sections	67
Exceptions and Requirements for Programming	68
Process Safety Time	71

---

## Available Language Sections

### Introduction

For programming your SIL3 project, you are only allowed to use the following 2 programming languages:

- function block diagram (FBD)
- ladder diagram (LD)

Both are languages defined by the IEC 61131-3 for the programming of PLCs.

### Description of the Restrictions on Language

If you create a SIL3 project, the following restrictions apply:

- At creation time, Unity Pro XLS restricts your choice of programming language.
- At import time, Unity Pro XLS ignores any section other than FBD or LD, but does not stop the import. The use of sections other than FBD or LD generates errors.
- At analyze time, Unity Pro XLS checks each section for its language. If any test fails, it creates an error and does not generate your program.

You can find a detailed description of the restrictions on program structure, language elements, and data configuration in *Exceptions and Requirements for Programming*, page 68.

---

## Exceptions and Requirements for Programming

### Introduction

To program a SIL3 project, you must use the programming languages FBD and LD only while at the same time observing the rules listed below concerning the program structure, language elements, and data configuration.

### Requirements for the Program Structure

You are only allowed to program your SIL3 project in master task (MAST task) sections.

You are not allowed:

- to program **FAST**, **TIMER**, **INTERRUPT**, and **AUX** tasks. In case of an import, Unity Pro XLS ignores the objects not allowed and informs you of their existence. If you continue the import, it is done without the objects that are not allowed, which may lead to errors or it may stop if the import is not possible
- to use subroutines (SR sections)
- to schedule segments
- to call remote I/Os in parallel

### **WARNING**

#### **POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS**

Do not use conditional section execution with Unity Pro XLS.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

### Requirements for Language Elements

You are only allowed to use functions and function blocks (FFBs) that are certified for use in Safety logic and described in the Unity Pro Safety Block Library.

You are not allowed to use:

- derived function blocks (DFB)s
- ST expressions

In LD, you are not allowed to use:

- halt coils
- call coils
- returns
- operate blocks
- compare blocks

**NOTE:** Though jumps to labels are allowed in FBD and LD, Schneider Electric recommends not using them for a better structuring of your Safety logic.

---

## Requirements for Configuring Data

You are only allowed to use:

- the elementary data types (EDTs) BOOL, EBOOL, BYTE, WORD, DWORD, INT, UINT, DINT, UDINT, FLOAT and TIME
- simple arrays (the index can only be a literal) but for Ethernet global data communication only; for details, see the chapter "Programming" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*
- direct addressing, for instance, writing %MW4000 by a coil in LD
- located variables. All instances of variables are not only checked with regard to being located but also as to being located in a valid memory area, see also *Memory Area, page 101*

You are not allowed to create derived data types (DDTs).

**NOTE:** You are not allowed to use variables from the unrestricted memory areas in your user logic unless you may connect it to the input of S\_SMOVE\_BIT or S\_SMOVE\_WORD function blocks, see also *Memory Area, page 101*.

## Checks for Programming

At creation time of a SIL3 project, Unity Pro XLS offers only the features allowed for Safety logic. Any attempt to create objects not allowed leads to an error.

However, objects not allowed can be inserted through source file import. Therefore, Unity Pro XLS checks all objects at analyze time. At any rule not obeyed or any object not allowed, Unity Pro XLS creates an error and does not generate your project.

In the project settings, Unity Pro XLS provides the following different options concerning the warnings of the language analyzer:

- Variables not used
- Multiple writing of variables
- Parameters not assigned
- Multiple use of FB instances
- Overlapping of addresses

### **WARNING**

#### **POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS**

Switch on all warning options in the project settings and check the warnings to make sure that they are not critical and that the behavior is intended.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

---

## Requirements for Monitoring

Unity Pro XLS is the only programming software allowed to load or to modify your SIL3 project. Other programming packages or HMIs may monitor both the state and functions of the Safety-Related System but must not alter them. Any other device is allowed to read data from the Safety PLC but writing to a Safety PLC is restricted, see also *Memory Area, page 101*.

---

## Process Safety Time

### Description of the Process Safety Time

The process Safety time (PST) is a critical measure of each process. It is defined as the period between the occurrence of a failure in equipment under control (EUC) and the occurrence of a hazardous event if the Safety Function is not performed.

**NOTE:** The process Safety time is given by the process. It must be ensured that the Safety-Related System is able to perform the Safety Functions within the process Safety time.


### Description of the System Reaction Time

The system reaction time is the sum of the PLC reaction time and the time for the used sensor device ( $T_S$ ) and the time for the used actuator device ( $T_A$ ).  $T_S$  and  $T_A$  are device specific.

The following equation is valid:

$$\text{System reaction time} = \text{PLC reaction time} + T_S + T_A$$

This equation is illustrated below:



The system reaction time must be less than the process Safety time.

### Description of the PLC Reaction Time

The PLC reaction time is the sum of the related time for the used input module ( $T_i$ ) and the used output module ( $T_o$ ) and the CPU reaction time ( $T_{CPU}$ ).

The following equation is valid:

$$\text{PLC reaction time} = T_{CPU} + T_i + T_o$$

---

### Description of the CPU Reaction Time

The CPU reaction time is directly impacted by the CPU cycle time which is needed to execute the Safety logic. A signal may appear just at the beginning of the execution cycle when the signals have already been processed. Therefore, 2 cycles may be necessary to react to the signal.

This leads to the following equation:

$$\text{CPU reaction time} = 2 \times \text{CPU cycle time}$$

In addition, it is possible to define a maximum number of accepted CRC faults ( $N_{\text{CRC}}$ ) for the communication with the I/Os. This has been introduced to reduce spurious effects (for instance by an EMC disturbance). This number can be defined to take a value between 1 and 3. This must be taken into account because the number of cycles for the output module to react is increased.

Therefore, the equation above is extended as follows:

$$\text{CPU reaction time} = (2 + N_{\text{CRC}}) \times \text{CPU cycle time}$$

### Description of the Time for Input Modules

The maximum times (worst case) for the Safety digital input module and for the Safety analog input module  $T_I$  are 45 ms (3 times the module's cycle time).

### Description of the Time for Output Modules

The maximum time  $T_O$  for the Safety digital output module is equal to the cycle time of the module:

$$T_O = 15 \text{ ms}$$

For the Safety digital output module, a timeout  $T_{\text{OUT}}$  must be configured. The module timeout must be greater than the CPU cycle time, see below.

You can find a detailed procedure for configuring the module timeout of digital output modules in the chapter "Configuring I/O Modules for Safety Projects" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.



---

## Description of the Maximum CPU Cycle Time

Knowing the required PST and the maximum reaction time of the sensors and actuators, you are able to calculate the maximum PLC reaction time tolerable in your process.

To ensure that the system reaction time is smaller than the process Safety time, the maximum CPU cycle time must fulfill the following condition:

$$\text{Max. CPU cycle time} < (\text{PST} - T_I - T_O - T_S - T_A) / (2 + N_{\text{CRC}})$$

In addition, you must consider the following relation between the maximum timeout  $T_{\text{OUT}}$  for the output modules and the maximum CPU cycle time:

$$T_{\text{OUT}} > \text{max. CPU cycle time} \times (1 + N_{\text{CRC}})$$

## Example Calculation

The following values are given:

- required PST = 1.1 s
- $T_I = 45$  ms
- $T_O = 15$  ms
- $T_S = 100$  ms
- $T_A = 500$  ms
- $N_{\text{CRC}} = 1$

The maximum CPU cycle time is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Max. CPU cycle time} < (1100 \text{ ms} - 45 \text{ ms} - 15 \text{ ms} - 100 \text{ ms} - 500 \text{ ms}) / 3$$

$$\text{Max. CPU cycle time} < 146.7 \text{ ms}$$

The requirement that the module timeout of the digital output module must be greater than the CPU cycle time is fulfilled:

$$T_{\text{OUT}} > 300 \text{ ms}$$

In case of a fault of the CPU, the outputs are set to Safe state after the timeout has expired. Therefore, the system needs the following time to shut down the outputs:

$$T_{\text{OUT}} + T_O$$

In the example, this time amounts to

$$300 \text{ ms} + 15 \text{ ms} = 315 \text{ ms}$$

---

### **CPU Cycle Time in a Hot Standby System**

In a normally running Hot Standby system, the formula for the CPU cycle time is the same:

$$\text{Max. CPU cycle time} < (\text{PST} - T_I - T_O - T_S - T_A) / (2 + N_{\text{CRC}})$$

In addition, you must consider the following relation between the maximum timeout  $T_{\text{OUT}}$  for the output modules and the maximum CPU cycle time:

$$T_{\text{OUT}} > 4 \times \text{max. CPU cycle time (worst case)}$$

---

## Configuring the Maximum CPU Cycle Time

The Quantum Safety PLC can perform cyclic or periodic execution. There is no difference between the behavior of a standard Quantum PLC and a Quantum Safety PLC regarding cyclic and periodic execution. In both cases, you must configure the maximum acceptable CPU cycle time in Unity Pro XLS.

The maximum allowed CPU cycle time (watchdog) is configured in the properties of the MAST task. For details, see the chapter "Programming" in the *Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual* and the chapter "Presentation of the Master Task" in the *Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual*.

**NOTE:** The minimum CPU cycle time is 20 ms.

**NOTE:** Only configure a maximum number of %M and %MW that is really needed. All configured memory ranges %M and %MW are compared as part of the double execution, which takes roughly 5.5 ms per 10,000 words. Therefore, you increase the cycle time unnecessarily if you configure more memory than needed.

You must check your CPU cycle time when commissioning your project. At this time, Unity Pro XLS provides the real time values from the PLC.

You can find this information

- in the **Task** tab available using the menu entry **Tools** → **PLC Screen**.
- in %SW30, containing the current time of the MAST task execution.
- in %SW31, containing the maximum time of the MAST task execution.
- in %SW32, containing the minimum time of the MAST task execution.

For details, see *Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59, page 145* or the chapter "Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW47" in the *Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual*. If your maximum acceptable CPU cycle time is exceeded, you must adjust your configuration or your user logic or both to reach the required value.

### **WARNING**

#### **RISK OF EXCEEDING THE PROCESS SAFETY TIME**

Set the maximum CPU cycle time taking into account your process Safety time.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

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## 3.2 Software Description

---

### Introduction

This section describes the special characteristics of Unity Pro XLS developed to program SIL3 applications.

### What's in this Section?

This section contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
Unity Pro XLS	77
Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications	79
Application Password	83

---

# Unity Pro XLS

## Introduction

To meet the requirements of the IEC 61508, only certified software is allowed for programming SIL3 applications. For this purpose, Schneider Electric has developed the Safety version of the programming tool Unity Pro XLS (XL-Safety). It is able to perform both fault diagnostics and project protection to an extent necessary for programming a SIL3 project.

**NOTE:** When you create a new project with Unity Pro XLS, the choice of the Quantum PLC type determines if a SIL3 or non-Safety project is created.

## SIL3 and Non-Safety Applications

Unity Pro XLS can be used to program both SIL3 and non-Safety applications. Thus, no other programming software is necessary. Only 1 version can be installed on your computer.

Your SIL3 project is stored in binary project files (*STU*) and in archive project files (*STA*). You cannot open these files with non-Safety versions of Unity Pro. Further, you can only download your executable binary files (*APX*) into a Safety CPU. For details, see the chapter "Services in Offline Mode" (see *Unity Pro, Operating Modes*.) in the *Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual*.

Non-Safety projects created by non-Safety Unity Pro versions must be exported using the appropriate Unity Pro version and imported into Unity Pro XLS.

## Description of the Project Protection

Unity Pro XLS offers protection against unauthorized access concerning your SIL3 project and the Quantum Safety PLC as well as Unity Pro XLS itself.

Your SIL3 project and the Quantum Safety PLC are protected by the following password mechanisms:

- The SIL3 project is protected by a password at the application level, the application password. When you create a SIL3 project, an empty password, which you can change, is set.
- The Quantum Safety PLC is also protected by the application password. In case there is no application in the PLC, it accepts any password.
- Connecting to a Safety PLC requires to enter the application password if the currently opened project in Unity Pro XLS is different or no project is opened.

---

Unity Pro XLS itself is protected by the following mechanisms:

- You can define access rights or a list of functions a user is allowed to perform using the Security Editor provided together with Unity Pro XLS (and having the same functionality as in Unity Pro XL).
- After a configured time of inactivity, Unity Pro XLS is locked automatically. Before being able to continue to work with it, you must enter the application password. While Unity Pro XLS is locked, the connection to the PLC is maintained and it stays in the current mode.

### Description of the Security Editor

To protect Unity Pro XLS against unauthorized access, you can use the Security Editor

- to apply a policy and to create profiles and users for it.
- to manage access rights to it.

For example, you can restrict the access for

- creating or modifying the application password,
- entering Maintenance Mode, or
- adapting the auto-lock timeout.

For details of using the Security Editor, see also the chapter "Access Security Management" (see *Unity Pro, Operating Modes*,) in the *Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual* and the chapter "Security Management for Unity Pro XLS" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

**NOTE:** Use the features provided by the Security Editor to protect Unity Pro XLS against unauthorized access. However, using the Security Editor does not remove the necessity to protect your SIL3 project by using an application password.

### Description of the Auto-Lock Feature

Unity Pro XLS offers the option to protect itself against unauthorized access after a configured time of inactivity. After this time is exceeded, Unity Pro XLS prompts you to enter the application password.

You can find a detailed procedure for activating the auto-lock in the chapter "Protection of a Safety Project with Unity Pro XLS" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

### Default Values

When you create a new SIL3 project, the following values are set by default:

- The application password is empty.
- The auto-lock is activated, allowing 10 minutes of inactivity before Unity Pro XLS is locked.

---

## Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications

### Introduction

Schneider Electric offers you a number of elementary functions (EF) and function blocks (EFBs) that are certified for use in SIL3 applications. For details, see the Unity Pro Safety Block Library.

### Remark

FFBs that are available for different data types are labeled with \*\*\*.

For example, the elementary function S\_AND\_\*\*\* is available for the data type

- BOOL as S\_AND\_BOOL.
- BYTE as S\_AND\_BYTE.
- WORD as S\_AND\_WORD.
- DWORD as S\_AND\_DWORD.

### Description of the Safety FFBs for Mathematics

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of mathematical functions:

Name	Type	Used...
S_ADD_***	EF	to add the input values
S_SUB_***	EF	to subtract the input 2 from the input 1 value
S_MUL_***	EF	to multiply the input value
S_DIV_***	EF	to divide the Dividend input value by the Divisor input value
S_NEG_***	EF	to negate the input values
S_ABS_***	EF	to compute the absolute value of the input value
S_SIGN_***	EF	to detect negative signs
S_SMOVE_BIT	EFB	to assign the input value to the output (to use data from unrestricted memory area in the Safety logic)
S_SMOVE_WORD		

---

## Description of the Safety FFBs for Comparison

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of comparison functions:

Name	Type	Used to check the values of successive inputs...
S_EQ_***	EF	for equality
S_GT_***	EF	for a decreasing sequence
S_GE_***	EF	for a decreasing sequence or equality
S_LT_***	EF	for an increasing sequence
S_LE_***	EF	for an increasing sequence or equality
S_NE_***	EF	for inequality

## Description of the Safety FFBs for Logic

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of logic functions:

Name	Type	Used...
S_AND_***	EF	to perform a bit by bit AND link of the input bit sequence
S_OR_***	EF	to perform a bit OR link of the input bit sequence
S_XOR_***	EF	to perform a bit XOR link of the input bit sequence
S_NOT_***	EF	to negate the input sequence bit by bit
S_SHL_***	EF	to shift a bit pattern to the left
S_SHR_***	EF	to shift a bit pattern to the right
S_ROL_***	EF	to rotate a bit pattern circularly to the left
S_ROR_***	EF	to rotate a bit pattern circularly to the right
S_RS	EFB	as RS memory with a dominant reset input
S_SR	EFB	as SR memory with a dominant set input
S_F_TRIG	EFB	to detect falling edges
S_R_TRIG	EFB	to detect rising edges



---

### Description of the Safety FFBs for Statistics

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of statistical functions:

Name	Type	Used...
S_MIN_***	EF	to assign the smallest input value to the output
S_MAX_***	EF	to assign the largest input value to the output
S_LIMIT_***	EF	to transfer the unchanged input value to the output if it lies within the minimum and the maximum limit
S_MUX_***	EF	to transfer the respective input value to the output depending on the K input value
S_SEL	EF	for a binary selection between 2 input values

### Description of the Safety FFBs for Timers and Counters

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of timer and counter functions:

Name	Type	Used...
S_CTU_***	EFB	for counting upwards
S_CTD_***	EFB	for counting downwards
S_CTUD_***	EFB	for counting upwards and downwards
S_TON	EFB	as on delay timer
S_TOF	EFB	as off delay timer
S_TP	EFB	for generating a pulse with defined duration

---

## Description of the Safety FFBs for Type Conversion

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of type conversion functions:

Name	Type	Used to convert an input value of the data type...
S_BOOL_TO_***	EF	BOOL to a BYTE, WORD, DWORD, INT, DINT, UINT, or UDINT data type
S_BYTE_TO_***	EF	BYTE to a BOOL, WORD, DWORD, INT, DINT, UINT, or UDINT data type
S_WORD_TO_***	EF	WORD to a BOOL, BYTE, DWORD, INT, DINT, UINT, or UDINT data type
S_DWORD_TO_***	EF	DWORD to a BOOL, BYTE, WORD, INT, DINT, UINT, or UDINT data type
S_INT_TO_***	EF	INT to a BOOL, BYTE, WORD, DWORD, DINT, UINT, or UDINT data type
S_DINT_TO_***	EF	DINT to a BOOL, BYTE, WORD, DWORD, INT, UINT, or UDINT data type
S_UINT_TO_***	EF	UINT to a BOOL, BYTE, WORD, DWORD, INT, DINT, or UDINT data type
S_UDINT_TO_***	EF	UDINT to a BOOL, BYTE, WORD, DWORD, INT, DINT, or UINT data type

## Description of the Safety FFBs for High Availability

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of functions for high availability:

Name	Type	Used...
S_DISIL2	EFB	to select the data from the 2 digital input modules in case of a redundant input module configuration
S_AISIL2	EFB	to select the data from the 2 analog input modules in case of a redundant input module configuration

## Description of the Safety FFBs for Hot Standby

The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of functions for Hot Standby:

Name	Type	Used...
S_HSBY_SWAP	EFB	to swap between primary and standby CPU in case of a Hot Standby solution

Details of how to use the Safety FFBs in your project you can find in the *Unity Pro Safety Block Library*.

---

## Application Password

### Password Protection Management

In the following situations, you are requested to enter the application password:

- opening an existing SIL2 or SIL3 project
- modifying the application password
- clearing the application password
- connecting to the Safety PLC
- exceeding the configured time of inactivity and launching the auto-lock mechanism

You can find detailed procedures for managing the application password in the chapter "Project Properties and Password for Unity Pro XLS" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

**NOTE:** Schneider Electric strongly recommends changing the default password immediately after having selected a Quantum Safety CPU in order to protect your project against unauthorized access from the beginning. Yet, if you forget to change the default password, the empty password is kept even if you save and close your project. When re-opening it, just click **OK**, that is leave the edit field empty, and change the password as soon as possible.

### Losing the Application Password

You can find detailed procedures for what to do in case you have lost the application password in the chapter "Loss of Password" (see *Unity Pro XLS Software, Operating Mode Manual, Safety PLC Specifics*) in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

---

## 3.3 Operating Procedures

---

### Introduction

This section deals with the operating procedures of the Quantum Safety PLC with special regard to its 2 special operating modes.

### What's in this Section?

This section contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
Operating Modes of the Safety PLC	85
Safety Mode	87
Maintenance Mode	89
Forcing	91

---

## Operating Modes of the Safety PLC

### Introduction

The default behavior of the Quantum Safety PLC is to perform Safety Functions in order to achieve and to maintain the Safe state of a process. Nevertheless, you must be able to debug and to maintain your project.

Therefore, the Quantum Safety PLC can run in the following 2 operating modes:

- the Safety Mode
- the Maintenance Mode

You can use the Safety Mode to control your process, whereas the Maintenance Mode is for debugging and tuning your project.

In Maintenance Mode, the I/O and CPU modules are still executing the diagnostics and will establish the Safe state if a fault is detected. Only the application program and the application data which may be changed in Maintenance Mode are not checked.

### Safety and Maintenance Mode Features

The operating mode of the Quantum Safety PLC depends on events such as application exception, power on/off, and so on. The functions available in Unity Pro XLS depend on the operating mode.

Switching between the modes requires defined conditions and follows certain procedures. For details, see the chapter "Switching Between Safety and Maintenance Mode" (*see Unity Pro XLS Software, Operating Mode Manual, Safety PLC Specifics*) in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

You can interact with the Safety PLC using:

- the programming tool Unity Pro XLS
- the keypad of the Quantum Safety CPU
- the key switch

Depending on the operating mode, the Safety PLC can be in different states.

After power up, it automatically enters run state of the Safety Mode if the following 2 conditions are fulfilled:

- There is a valid application.
- The **Automatic start in Run** option is activated.


In case of an invalid application, it enters the not configured (no conf) state of the Maintenance Mode (only if the key state is unlocked), in which you are able to download your project.

If a fault is detected, the PLC enters

- halt state when running in Maintenance Mode.
- error state when running in Safety Mode.

## PLC States

The following figure shows the state diagram of the Quantum Safety PLC:



## Operating Mode Identification

You can identify the running mode

- by a LCD display on the CPU or
- by a status bar field on the PLC screen provided by Unity Pro XLS.

The LCD display on the CPU indicates the current operating mode by showing the letters *M* for Maintenance Mode or *S* for Safety Mode.

The status bar field on the PLC screen indicates the current operating mode as shown in the following figure:



---

## Safety Mode

### Safety Mode Description

The Safety Mode is the default mode of the Quantum Safety PLC. It is a restricted mode in which modifications and maintenance activities are prohibited.

### Safety Mode Restrictions

When the PLC is running in Safety Mode, the following restrictions are implemented by Unity Pro XLS:

- Download changes are not allowed.
- Setting and forcing of Safety variables and Safety I/Os is not allowed.
- Debugging with breakpoints, watch points, and single step is not allowed.
- Animation tables and operator screens must not write Safety variables and Safety I/Os.
- The Safety memory is write protected; that means that human-machine interfaces (HMIs) and other PLCs cannot write to it. This is controlled by the Safety PLC, see also *Memory Area, page 101*.

**NOTE:** The logic animation, animation tables, and operator screens can influence the scan time.

**NOTE:** It is possible to download a new version of the Ethernet processor firmware into the Quantum Safety CPU with the OSLoader. However, it is only allowed to do that in Maintenance Mode.

 <b>WARNING</b>
<b>POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS</b>
Do not download a new version of the Ethernet processor firmware into the Quantum Safety CPU in Safety Mode. It is possible to do so but not allowed.
<b>Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.</b>

### Safety Mode States

Once the Safety Mode is entered, the PLC can be in run state and in error state. In run state, all restrictions are active and the results of the double user code execution are compared. If any test is unsuccessful, the PLC goes to error state because it has no means to recover from the error.

---

## Entering Safety Mode

There are 4 ways of entering Safety Mode:

- when the Safety PLC is powered up
- when the Safety Mode is entered from Maintenance Mode
- when the key is locked
- when Unity Pro XLS is disconnected either by the customer or because of a broken connection

When the Safety PLC is powered up, it automatically enters Safety Mode.

**NOTE:** After power up and if there is a valid application, the PLC only performs cold start.

Thus, the project is reinitialized and the system performs:

- the initialization of data with the initial values defined in the project
- the initialization of elementary function blocks (EFBs) based on initial data
- the initialization of data declared in the EFBs
- the initialization of system bit and words
- the cancellation of any forcing, see also *Forcing, page 91*

Switching from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode is only possible if the PLC is not debugging.

**NOTE:** Data forced before switching to Safety Mode stay forced after switching, see also *Forcing, page 91*.

Details concerning the transition from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode can be found in the chapter "Switching Between Safety and Maintenance Mode" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

## Automatic Start in Run Option

You have the possibility to let your project automatically enter Safety Mode's run state after power up. To do this, activate the option **Automatic start in Run**, see also the chapter "Configuration of Quantum Processors" (see *Unity Pro, Operating Modes*.) in the *Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual*. However, Schneider Electric recommends using the **Run** command instead of the **Automatic start in Run** option for a SIL3 project to enter run state.

### **WARNING**

#### **UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION**

Avoid using the **Automatic start in Run** option. If you use this feature, it is your responsibility to program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**



---

## Maintenance Mode

### Maintenance Mode Description

The Maintenance Mode of the Quantum Safety PLC is a temporary mode for modifying your project and debugging and maintaining your program.

### Maintenance Mode Features

This mode is available in both RUN and STOP.

The PLC allows direct transition from RUN SAFE to RUN MAINTENANCE (and RUN MAINTENANCE to RUN SAFE.)

The Maintenance Mode (protected by a password) allow users to perform:

- online modifications (programs enhancements, temporary modifications, etc.)
- forcing values for sensor or actuator maintenance
- system installation and commissioning

When the PLC is running in Maintenance Mode, the following features are implemented by Unity Pro XLS:

- Download changes are allowed.
- Setting and forcing of Safety variables and Safety I/Os is allowed. However, only variables of the type `EBOOL` can be forced.
- Switching to Safety Mode while forcing is allowed. The forced variables stay forced, see also *Forcing, page 91*.
- Debugging with breakpoints, watch points, and single step is allowed. However, the PLC must be in run state.
- Animation tables and operator screens can write Safety variables and Safety I/Os.
- The Safety memory is write protected; that means that HMIs or other PLCs cannot write to it. This is controlled by the Safety PLC, see also *Memory Area, page 101*.

### Entering Maintenance Mode

You can only enter Maintenance Mode from Safety Mode because after power up the PLC automatically enters Safety Mode. To exit Safety Mode and enter Maintenance Mode, the key switch must be unlocked. You can find procedures for switching between the modes in the chapter "Switching Between Safety and Maintenance Mode" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

---

## Maintenance Mode States

In Maintenance Mode, the PLC can be in run state or in halt state. When it is in run state, you can modify your project. Further, you can switch to Debug Mode if you want to debug and maintain your program. In run state, the double code execution is performed but the result of the comparison is ignored.

### **DANGER**

#### **RISK OF LOSING THE SAFETY FUNCTION DURING COMMISSIONING AND MAINTENANCE**

All modifications of the running system must follow the requirements of the IEC 61508.

**Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.**

---

## Forcing

### Introduction

Forcing is only possible in Maintenance Mode. However, it is possible to switch from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode while data are forced and the forcing stays active.

**NOTE:** Check the latest version of the TÜV document *Maintenance Override* for the procedures which must be applied when using forcing in a Safety-Related System. You can find it on the TÜV Rheinland Group website <http://www.tuvasi.com/>.

 <b>WARNING</b>
--

<b>LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS</b>
--

Make sure that the forcing is turned on only temporarily and that the user logic is supervising the status of forcing (%SW108, see <i>Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127, page 148</i> ).
--

<b>Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.</b>
---

---

## Handling Forced Data

Because forced data stays forced, Unity Pro XLS warns you before executing your switch command from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode and prompts you to confirm it.

**NOTE:** In case of a disconnection between PLC and Unity Pro XLS, the latter also warns you if there are forced data, independently of the mode the PLC is in. This is due to the fact that the PLC automatically enters Safety Mode when being disconnected from Unity Pro XLS by the user or a communication interruption.

 <b>WARNING</b>
--

<b>RISK OF PROCESSING FORCED DATA</b>
---------------------------------------

Check the state of your data before switching from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode. Forced data stays forced and the PLC continues processing them. Make sure that your PLC processes the correct, unforced data necessary for performing the Safety Functions.
---

<b>Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.</b>
---

You can check the status of forcing by reading the system word %SW108. It contains the number of forced I/O module bits. The system word is incremented on every forcing and decremented on every unforcing.

---

## 3.4 Special Features and Procedures

---

### Introduction

This section explains the special features and procedures using Unity Pro XLS as a programming tool for SIL3 projects.

### What's in this Section?

This section contains the following topics:

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Page</b>
Checking the Programming Environment	94
Starting the Quantum Safety PLC	95
Version Stamp	96
Upload	97
Project Backups	98
Detected Faults	99

---

## Checking the Programming Environment

### Introduction

Unity Pro XLS provides the possibility to perform a self-test in order to verify that the components currently in use are the correct versions originally installed and are not corrupted, for instance by hard disk corruption. The self-test is done by evaluating the CRC.

### Description of the Self-Test

When performing the self-test, Unity Pro XLS checks the version and CRC of

- DLLs of Unity Pro XLS,
- the Safety FFB-library database, and
- the hardware catalog database.

### WARNING

#### **RISK OF CORRUPTED PROGRAM**

Use the self-test of Unity Pro XLS on a regular basis to check the integrity of your program. At least, perform the self-test

- after installing any software on or removing it from your computer.
- before loading the final operating program into the Safety PLC.
- before modifying a program in the running Safety PLC.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

You can find details of how to start the self-test in the chapter "Unity Pro XLS Self-Test" (see *Unity Pro XLS Software, Operating Mode Manual, Safety PLC Specifics*) in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

---

## Starting the Quantum Safety PLC

### Preconditions

Preconditions to start the Quantum Safety PLC are that you have

- configured your Safety-Related System correctly,
- programmed your SIL3 project correctly,
- tested the integrity of both your SIL3 project and Unity Pro XLS,
- connected Unity Pro XLS to your Safety PLC, and
- downloaded your SIL3 project into the Safety PLC.

### Starting the Quantum Safety PLC

Once the Quantum Safety PLC contains a valid project, it only performs cold start. Therefore, you can only start your SIL3 project by performing a cold start except when you have just downloaded your project into the PLC.

Hence, you can start your project out of the following 2 initial states:

- The PLC is powered up and you have downloaded your SIL3 project since power up.
- The PLC is powered off.

Further, Unity Pro XLS offers the **Automatic start in Run** option. If it is activated, your PLC automatically enters run state in Safety Mode after power up. However, Schneider Electric recommends not using this option.

### WARNING

#### UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION

Avoid using the **Automatic start in Run** option. If you use this feature, it is your responsibility to program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

You can find detailed procedures for starting a SIL3 project in the chapter "Starting and Stopping a Safety Project" (*see Unity Pro XLS Software, Operating Mode Manual, Safety PLC Specifics*) in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

---

## Version Stamp

### Version Stamp Description

In Unity Pro XLS, each generated binary file of a SIL3 project has a version stamp, providing date and time of build. Thus, you can check both if and when your project has been subject to modifications.

You can find a detailed procedure for checking the project version in the chapter "Project Properties for Unity Pro XLS" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.



---

## Upload

### Uploading a SIL3 Project

Uploading a project from the PLC to Unity Pro XLS is also available for SIL3 projects. If you want to use this feature, it must be selected in the project settings. In a SIL3 project, the application password must be known to be able to connect to the PLC. In addition, the PLC must be switched to Maintenance Mode to perform the upload. For further details, see the chapter "Project Settings" (see *Unity Pro, Operating Modes*;) in the *Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual*.

---

## Project Backups

### Introduction

Unity Pro XLS checks the integrity of your SIL3 project by calculating a CRC when you close it and checking the CRC when you open it again. The CRC indicates by changing its value if your project has been damaged or corrupted. In this case, the comparison indicates the values are not the same and Unity Pro XLS does not open your project. As a result, you cannot connect Unity Pro XLS to the Safety PLC and, therefore, have no possibility of modifying or repairing your corrupt project.

### Project Backup Description

Besides uploading the project from the PLC (see *Upload, page 97*), the only way to get access to your project is to have a copy of its original, that is a backup of your project. From this backup, you can copy back your project data, that is restore them.

**NOTE:** Create backups of your SIL3 project on a regular basis. Once your project is damaged or corrupted, you cannot open it to modify or repair it yourself.

### Advice for Creating Backups

Creating backups requires careful planning including consideration of

- Backup software  
Automated backup cannot be affected by human error to the extent that manual backup can.
- Backup procedure  
Making more than 1 copy and storing them offsite increases the possibility of a successful data recovery
- Backup type.  
In general, a backup can be full, incremental, or differential depending on which data it backs up.
- Backup interval  
Regularly scheduled backups improve the reliability of data recovery.
- Backup media type  
Whereas hard disk based storage is very practical, remote backups imply offsite storage.

### Advice for Recovering Data

A backup is only as useful as its associated recovery strategy. Therefore, it is not only important to save the backup data but also to have access to the software required to read them.

**NOTE:** Choose the backup policy that is the most appropriate for your Safety-Related System. Make the adequate amounts and types of backups. Test frequently the process for restoring the original project from the backup copies.

---

## Detected Faults

### Introduction

If a fault is detected by any of the internal diagnostic measures and system tests, the behavior of the Quantum Safety PLC varies according to the mode that it is in.

### Fault Behavior in Safety Mode

Running in Safety Mode, your PLC enters error state in case of a single detected fault because it has no means to recover from it. The error state is a hardware locked state. Your project is stopped and you cannot intervene or communicate with it.

### Leaving the Error State

The only way to leave the error state is to start your PLC again, whereupon the PLC performs self-tests and initializes your project.

If your project ...	Then your PLC...
is valid	enters stop state, which it is forced to do because of the detected fault.
is invalid	enters no conf state.

**NOTE:** The PLC may be in an error state if the persistent detection of an error occurs. In this case, it may be necessary to replace the PLC.

Depending on the state which your PLC is in, perform the following steps:

If your project is ...	Then ...
in stop state and the autorun option activated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• either power on your PLC again</li><li>• or perform a <b>Run</b> command.</li></ul>
in stop state and the autorun option not activated	perform a <b>Run</b> command.
in no conf state	download a backup of your project.

### Fault Behavior in Maintenance Mode

Running in Maintenance Mode, your PLC enters

- halt state in case of a diagnostic error.
- error state in case of a hardware watchdog occurrence.

If the PLC is in halt state, you still have the possibility to communicate with it and therefore to debug your project. With the **Init** command or the download of a project, the PLC goes to stop state and can now be restarted. If the PLC is in error state, the behavior is the same as described above in *Fault Behavior in Safety Mode*.

---

## 3.5                    **Communication**

---

### **Introduction**

This section deals with the communication of the Quantum Safety PLC with Unity Pro XLS as well as with other devices.

### **What's in this Section?**

This section contains the following topics:

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Page</b>
Memory Area	101
PC-PLC Communication	104
PLC-PLC Communication	105
PLC-HMI Communication	107

---

## Memory Area

### Introduction

In Safety Mode, the Safety CPU rejects all write requests to the following memory areas:

- %M or %Q (0x register)
- %MW or %QW (4x register)
- EFB data

However, because it may be necessary for you to be able to write data to the Safety PLC, the memory is divided into a Safety and an unrestricted part, allowing you to write in %M as well as in %MW.

### Safety Memory Description

The Safety memory area is write protected for any other device.

**NOTE:** The write access is controlled inside the CPU because some communications, for example with the HMI or with other PLCs (Safety or non-Safety), are not configured in the Safety PLC with Unity Pro XLS and therefore cannot be checked in the Unity Pro XLS configuration.

### Write Protection Description

To prevent other devices from writing to the Safety memory area, there is a blocking mechanism. The PLC does not execute any write command and returns an error code.

### Unrestricted Memory Area Description

The unrestricted memory area (UMA) is a specially dedicated memory area for bits and words which is not write protected. It has the following characteristics:

- It is located at the beginning of the complete memory range.
- Its size can be configured in Unity Pro XLS.
- Its values cannot be used directly but by using specific function blocks.

---

## Configuring the Unrestricted Memory Area

You can configure the size of your unrestricted memory area in Unity Pro XLS in the CPU configuration with the following limits:

- In %MW, the limit is
  - the last word in the unrestricted area or
  - 0 if this area is not used.
- In %M, the limit is
  - a multiple of 16 and the last %M in the unrestricted area or
  - 0 if it is not used.

**NOTE:** Configure the unrestricted memory area first and confirm that the configured area is large enough. If this part of the memory must be modified later, all addresses must be changed.

### CAUTION

#### RISK OF CORRUPT PROJECT

Check that the size of the unrestricted memory area is correctly stored in the Quantum Safety CPU after the download of the PLC application. To do so, you must read the system words %SW110 and %SW111 (for instance using the animation table) and compare them with the configured values in your application.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.**

## Using Data from the Unrestricted Memory Area

To perform Safety Functions, you are only allowed to process data stored in the Safety memory area. If it is necessary to get access to the Safety Functions, you are allowed to use data from the unrestricted memory data. However, for Safety reasons, you cannot process them directly. Instead you must transfer data from the unrestricted memory area to the Safety memory area in order for Safety Functions to use these data.

You can find a detailed procedure for transferring data from the unrestricted to the Safety memory area in the chapter "Using Data from the Unrestricted Memory Area" in the *Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics*.

---

## Description of the Safety Move Function Blocks

Because you are not able to work with the values located in the unrestricted memory area directly, there are the following 2 function blocks enabling you to transfer data from the unrestricted memory area to the Safety memory:

- S\_SMOVE\_BIT to get access to bits
- S\_SMOVE\_WORD to get access to words

The variables from the unrestricted memory area are connected to the input of the function block, and its output is connected to a Safety variable. Direct addresses cannot be used because they are interpreted as `INT`. The WORD to be moved must be configured in the unrestricted memory area. If the actual value is not within the range, the output is set to 0 and the error is indicated. Additional inputs are used to control how the function blocks transfer the data to the outputs in case some data can only be used together in the same cycle.

**NOTE:** It is good practice to use an appropriate naming convention for variables from the unrestricted memory area and to comment them accordingly. This eases the audit of your SIL3 project.

The user can use data in the safety application by implementing a verification protocol (for example, send a word and its complement and then check the consistency in the application, copy the word in a new location and then reread the value, etc.).

## Write Protection Description

Unity Pro XLS checks at edition time and at build time that only variables from the unrestricted memory area are used as input to the Safety MOVE function blocks. In addition, Unity Pro XLS provides a cross-reference feature to search for the variable usage, enabling you to check the rule easily.

### **WARNING**

#### **RISK OF PROCESSING INCORRECT DATA**

Make sure that the data you move to the Safety memory area are correct data. Data transferred to the Safety memory area using the Safety MOVE function blocks are not automatically correct.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

To help ensure that data are transferred accurately, you can write the data to 2 different variables and then compare them.

---

## PC-PLC Communication

### Introduction

Once you have programmed your SIL3 project, you must connect Unity Pro XLS to the Quantum Safety PLC if you want to download, run, and maintain it. To enable the communication between both, you can connect Unity Pro XLS to the following:

- Modbus TCP (either with CPU or NOE module)
- Modbus Plus
- Modbus RS232 / RS485
- USB

The communication between Unity Pro XLS and the Quantum Safety PLC is not part of the Safety loop but nevertheless subject to checks. For instance, a CRC is used during the download of a project in order to verify that the data are transferred correctly and that there is no communication error. However, you must additionally check the version and functionality of your project as well as the Unity Pro XLS environment.

For the Ethernet cabling, the standard Ethernet devices can be used.



---

## PLC-PLC Communication

### Introduction

Concerning a Safety PLC, only writing to other PLCs is allowed. Reading from other PLCs is only allowed in the unrestricted memory area, see also *Memory Area, page 101*.

**NOTE:** The write access is controlled inside the CPU because some communications, for example with the HMI or with other PLCs, are not configured in the Safety PLC with Unity Pro XLS and therefore cannot be checked in the configuration.

The Quantum Safety PLC is able to communicate with other PLCs using the following:

- Modbus TCP (either with CPU or NOE module)
- Modbus Plus
- Modbus RS232 / RS485

These kinds of communication are categorized as non-interfering.

**NOTE:** Communication from the Quantum Safety PLC as a Modbus Master via Modbus is not allowed because the function blocks are not certified. However, as a Modbus slave, the Safety PLC may be connected to other PLCs and communicate data when requested, or even accept data in the unrestricted memory area.

### Description of the Ethernet Communication

The Ethernet network can be connected to

- either the Ethernet port of the CPU
- or the Ethernet module 140 NOE 771 11.

**NOTE:** In case of a Hot Standby Safety CPU, the Ethernet port is used for the data exchange between the primary and the standby CPU and therefore not available for the communication with other PLCs or HMIs.

The Ethernet module 140 NOE 771 11 is certified as non-interfering product for use in the Quantum Safety PLC. The communication can be either peer-to-peer or as global data.

For the Ethernet cabling, the standard Ethernet devices can be used.

### Configuring the Ethernet Peer-to-Peer Communication

The peer-to-peer communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Ethernet network configuration, independently for reading and writing. Unity Pro XLS checks that reading uses only the unrestricted memory area. It creates an error and does not generate code if this rule is not obeyed.

---

### Configuring the Ethernet Global Data Communication

The global data communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Ethernet network configuration to publish data for writing and to subscribe to data for reading. Because reading is only allowed from the unrestricted memory area, Unity Pro XLS checks this rule and creates an error if it is not obeyed.

### Description of the Modbus Plus Communication

The Modbus Plus module 140 NOM 2XX 00 is not allowed for communication. You can only use the Modbus Plus port of the CPU. On the Modbus Plus network, a peer-to-peer communication or a global data exchange is possible.

### Configuring the Modbus Plus Peer-to-Peer Communication

The peer-to-peer communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Modbus Plus network configuration, independently for reading and writing. Unity Pro XLS checks that reading uses only the unrestricted memory area. It creates an error and does not generate code if this rule is not obeyed.

### Configuring the Modbus Plus Global Data Communication

The global data communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Modbus Plus network configuration, independently for reading and writing. Unity Pro XLS checks that reading uses only the unrestricted memory area. It creates an error and does not generate code if this rule is not obeyed.

 <b>WARNING</b>
<b>UNDETECTABLE LOSS OF DATA</b>
Do not write from an external device to the Safety memory area in the Quantum Safety PLC using Ethernet. The data are ignored because of the Safety PLC's write protection. The data are lost without you being notified.
<b>Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.</b>

---

## PLC-HMI Communication

### Introduction

A HMI is allowed to read data from a Safety PLC. However, it is only allowed to write to the unrestricted memory area of the PLC, see also *Memory Area, page 101*. The Quantum Safety PLC is able to communicate with HMIs using the following:

- Modbus TCP (either with CPU or NOE module)
- Modbus Plus
- Modbus RS232 / RS485

The communication between PLC and HMI is not configured in Unity Pro XLS. Therefore, it cannot be controlled by it and the Quantum Safety CPU protects itself against writing from a HMI.

### Write Protection Description

The Safety memory area of the Safety PLC is write protected and you are not allowed to write to it. If you do not obey this rule, the PLC does not execute your write command, see also *Write Protection Description, page 101*.

### Writing in Maintenance Mode

Even in Maintenance Mode, there is a write protection of the Safety memory area for other PLCs and HMIs. But with Unity Pro XLS, you are able to modify and tune data.

With Unity Pro XLS, it is possible to

- modify logic.
- set values.
- force values.
- debug.

By using the Schneider Electric OPC server OFS or the web server of the PLC, it is also possible to modify data in the Safety memory area when in Maintenance Mode.

## WARNING

### RISK OF PROCESSING FORCED DATA

Follow the latest version of the TÜV document *Maintenance Override* if you use the Maintenance Mode to modify Safety data. You can find it on the TÜV Rheinland Group website <http://www.tuvasi.com/>.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**



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# Checklists



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## Introduction

For a system to perform Safety Functions, installing and configuring, programming, commissioning, and operating must meet the Safety requirements of the IEC 61508. To ensure that Safety aspects are observed, Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklists. However, these lists are not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.

## What's in this Chapter?

This chapter contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
Checklist for Configuring Safety-Related Systems	110
Checklist for Programming SIL3 Applications	112
Checklist for I/O Modules	114
Checklist for Operation, Maintenance, and Repair	116

## Checklist for Configuring Safety-Related Systems

### Introduction

This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.

### Checklist

Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for configuring your Safety-Related System:

Checks	Reference in this Manual	Done	Remarks
Check and verify the PFD/PFH values of the complete Safety loop.	<i>Functional Safety Certification, page 16</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Respect all rules described in the following reference manuals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>Quantum with Unity Pro Hardware Reference Manual</i></li> <li>● <i>Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual</i></li> <li>● <i>Grounding and Electromagnetic Compatibility of PLC Systems User Manual</i></li> <li>● <i>Modicon Remote I/O Cable System Planning and Installation Guide</i></li> <li>● <i>Modicon Quantum Hot Standby with Unity User Manual</i></li> <li>● <i>Premium, Atrium and Quantum using Unity Pro Communication services and architectures Reference manual</i></li> <li>● <i>Quantum TCPIP/IP Configuration User Manual</i></li> <li>● <i>Modicon Quantum with Unity Ethernet Network Modules User Manual</i></li> </ul>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Test and verify the complete configuration and wiring as part of the commissioning.		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use certified Safety and non-interfering modules only.	<i>Functional Safety Certification, page 16</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use modules with the certified firmware versions only. It is possible to check the firmware version of the CPU, CRP/CRA and NOE modules as well as that of the CPU Ethernet and CPU Hot Standby processors, with the OSloader. The firmware of the Safety I/O modules is displayed on the label on the housing.	<i>Functional Safety Certification, page 16</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Checks	Reference in this Manual	Done	Remarks
Configure the maximum scan time correctly and appropriately to the process.	<i>Requirements for Monitoring, page 70, Safety Mode Restrictions, page 87, Process Safety Time, page 71</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use an application password to protect your SIL3 application against unauthorized access.	<i>Application Password, page 83</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use only high availability RIO modules (140 CRP 932 00 and 140 CRA 932 00), which provide dual cabling.	<i>Description of the RIO Adapters, page 53, Description of the CPU-I/O Communication, page 39</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Protect the process power supply of the digital output modules by an appropriate fuse.	<i>Wiring Information, page 50</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use 2 power supply modules per rack and drop to improve the availability of your system. Mounting the 2 power supply modules on each end of the rack or drop provides better heat dissipation.	<i>Power Supply for the Quantum Safety PLC, page 52</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check in each drop that 1 power supply module is able to deliver the complete power consumption.	<i>Power Supply for the Quantum Safety PLC, page 52</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Make sure that the addresses of all CRA modules are configured correctly.	<i>Description of the RIO Adapters, page 53</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not write data to the Safety memory area from other devices (PLCs, HMI, and so on).	<i>Communication, page 100</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not download the Ethernet processor firmware while the PLC is running in Safety Mode.	<i>Safety Mode Restrictions, page 87</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

## Checklist for Programming SIL3 Applications

### Introduction

This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.

### Checklist

Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for programming your SIL3 application:

Checks	Reference in this Manual	Done	Remarks
Check the consistency of Unity Pro XLS regularly.	<i>Checking the Programming Environment, page 94</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check the correctness of your project.	<i>Programming Requirements, page 30</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Test and verify the complete logic as part of the commissioning.		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Configure the maximum %M and %MW correctly.	<i>Memory Area, page 101</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Configure the maximum unrestricted areas for %M and %MW correctly.	<i>Description of the Maximum CPU Cycle Time, page 73</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check that the configured maximum UMA for %M and %MW is downloaded correctly (check with %SW110 and %SW111).	<i>Memory Area, page 101</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check the correct usage of non-Safety-related data from the unrestricted memory area with S_SMOVE_*** function blocks.	<i>Memory Area, page 101</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check the range of WORD data of non-Safety-related data from the unrestricted memory area by configuring the S_SMOVE_WORD function block.	<i>Memory Area, page 101</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not use conditional execution of Safety logic sections.	<i>Requirements for the Program Structure, page 68</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not use jumps to labels inside FBD and LD logic.	<i>Requirements for Language Elements, page 68</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	



<b>Checks</b>	<b>Reference in this Manual</b>	<b>Done</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Program the non-Safety logic for non-interfering I/Os in separate sections.	<i>Available Non-Interfering Products, page 19</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Indicate the non-Safety-Related variables with an appropriate naming convention and comment.	<i>Memory Area, page 101</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Make sure that inputs or outputs of non-interfering I/O modules are not used for calculating Safety-Related outputs.	<i>Description of the I/O Modules, page 54</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not monitor concurrently a huge amount of data in Unity Pro XLS (leads to increase of scan time).	<i>Requirements for Monitoring, page 70</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
In the project settings, switch on all options for warnings during analysis. Check all warnings and make sure that they are not critical and that the behavior is intended.	<i>Checks for Programming, page 69</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

## Checklist for I/O Modules

### Introduction

This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.

### Checklist for the I/O Modules

Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for your I/O modules:

Checks	Reference in this Manual	Done	Remarks
Do not use Ethernet I/Os.	restrictions on I/Os	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not use Modbus Plus I/Os.	restrictions on I/Os	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Do not use non-interfering I/Os for Safety-Related functions.	descr. of I/O modules (see page 54)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
The wiring of the digital inputs must be de-energized to trip (a wiring fault must be equivalent to the de-energized state).	wiring of SDI (see page 47)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use appropriate grounding equipment for the analog input shielded wires.	wiring of SAI (see page 45)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
In burner management applications, the analog inputs must be monitored for grounding faults (leakage of current).	special req. for appl. standard (see page 119)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check that the configured timeout state of the output modules is appropriate for the connected device and the controlled process.	description of the timeout state	<input type="checkbox"/>	
In a redundant I/O system, use the 2 I/O channels on separate modules which should be located in separate drops.	redundant I/O configuration (see page 63)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use an appropriate wire type/size to connect the inputs/outputs of the I/O modules with the sensors and actuators.	RIO adapter (see page 53)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
For unused inputs of the Safety analog input module, the health bit of unused inputs should be masked in the health word of the module in your application logic.	wiring of SAI (see page 45)	<input type="checkbox"/>	

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<b>Checks</b>	<b>Reference in this Manual</b>	<b>Done</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Check that sensors and actuators connected to the I/O modules respect the specified values and limits of the I/O modules.	process safety time <i>(see page 71)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Use the red labels for the terminal blocks provided with the Safety I/O modules to indicate clearly the Safety modules.	gen. inf. on safety I/Os <i>(see page 39)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

## Checklist for Operation, Maintenance, and Repair

### Introduction

This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.

### Checklist

Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for operation, maintenance, and repair of your Safety-Related System:

Checks	Reference in this Manual	Done	Remarks
Define a standard operating procedure (SOP) for operation, maintenance, and repair of the Safety instrumented system and ensure that it is respected.		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Define a maintenance plan for your Safety-Related System according to the proof test interval.	<i>Proof Test Interval, page 22</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Maintain your Safety-Related System according to your maintenance plan.		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Create backups of your SIL3 project on a regular basis.	<i>Project Backups, page 98</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
When changing the Safety-Related System, follow the rules of the IEC61508-1, chapters 7.15 and 7.16 (even if only non-Safety-Related parts are modified).		<input type="checkbox"/>	
Follow the guidelines of the <i>Maintenance Override TÜV</i> document when using forcing (available on <a href="http://www.tuvasi.com/">http://www.tuvasi.com/</a> ).	<i>Forcing, page 91</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Check that forcing is switched off after the maintenance operation (either as part of the application or by an appropriate standard operating procedure).	<i>Forcing, page 91</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Monitor the status of the Safety I/O modules (health, out of range, overload, invalid channel), see also the <i>Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual</i> .	<i>Description of the RIO Adapters, page 53, Description of the CPU-I/O Communication, page 39</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Checks	Reference in this Manual	Done	Remarks
In a redundant I/O system, signal a fault in 1 of the redundant modules to the maintenance personnel.	<i>Safety I/O Modules in High Availability Configurations, page 40</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Signal a fault in 1 cable of the dual cable remote I/O system to the maintenance personnel.	<i>Description of the Hot Standby Configuration, page 35, Description of the RIO Adapters, page 53, Description of the CPU-I/O Communication, page 39</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
In a redundant power supply configuration, signal a fault of 1 of the 2 power supply modules to the maintenance personnel.	<i>Power Supply for the Quantum Safety PLC, page 52</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
In a HSBY system, use the S_HSBY_SWAP function block regularly (for example once a week) to check the ability of the standby controller to take over.	<i>Availability of the Hot Standby Functions, page 37</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
When replacing a CRA module, make sure that the address is configured correctly.	<i>Description of the RIO Adapters, page 53</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Make sure that your personnel possess all information and skills required to install, run, and maintain the Safety-Related System correctly.	<i>Training, page 28</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Make sure to follow the specified operating conditions regarding EMC, electrical, mechanical, and climatic influences.	<i>Hardware Requirements, page 29</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

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** DANGER**

**RISK OF LOSING THE SAFETY FUNCTION DURING COMMISSIONING AND MAINTENANCE**

All modifications of the running system must follow the requirements of the IEC 61508.

**Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.**

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## Special Requirements for Application Standards

# 5

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### Special Requirements for Application Standards

#### Fire and Gas Systems

Fire and gas systems should be integrated in accordance with EN 54.

Fire and gas applications must operate continuously to provide protection. As a result, the following industry guidelines apply:

- If inputs and outputs are energized to mitigate a problem, the PLC system must detect open and short circuits in the wiring between the PLC and the field devices and must raise alarms.
- The entire PLC system must have redundant power supplies. Further, the power supplies that are required to activate critical outputs and to read Safety-critical inputs must be redundant. All power supplies must be monitored for proper operation.
- De-energized outputs may be used for normal operation. To initiate the actions to mitigate a problem, the outputs are energized. This type of system shall monitor the critical output circuits to help ensure that they are properly connected to the end devices.

#### Emergency Shutdown Systems

In Emergency Shutdown systems, the Safe state of the plant is a de-energized or low (0) state.

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## Burner Management Systems

In burner management systems, the Safe state of the plant is a de-energized or low (0) state.

If a Safety-Related System is required to conform with the EN 50156 standard for electrical equipment in furnaces and to conform with the EN 298 standard for automatic gas burner control systems, the PLC throughput time should ensure that a Safe shutdown can be performed within 1 second after a problem in the process is detected. For the calculation, see *Process Safety Time, page 71*.


In burner management applications, the Safety analog input modules must be monitored for ground faults (leakage of current). The wires should be connected potential-free. With a shunt resistor (for instance 250  $\Omega$ ) between the ground rail of the grounding kit and the earth ground, a voltage can be measured in case of a leakage of the current on 1 of the analog inputs. This voltage must be supervised to detect a leakage.

A stabilized power supply of 20 VDC to 25 VDC must be used for the field power.



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# Appendices



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## Introduction

The appendices contain information on the IEC 61508 and its SIL policy. Further, technical data of the Safety and non-interfering modules are provided and example calculations are carried out.

## What's in this Appendix?

The appendix contains the following chapters:

Chapter	Chapter Name	Page
A	IEC 61508	123
B	System Objects	131



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# IEC 61508



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## Introduction

This chapter provides information on the Safety concepts of the IEC 61508 in general and its SIL policy in particular.

## What's in this Chapter?

This chapter contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
General Information on the IEC 61508	124
SIL Policy	126

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## General Information on the IEC 61508

### Introduction

Safety-Related Systems are developed for use in processes in which risks to humans, environment, equipment and production must be kept at an acceptable level. The risk depends on the severity and likelihood, thereby defining the necessary measures of protection.

Concerning the Safety of processes, there are 2 sides to be considered:

- the regulations and requirements defined by official authorities in order to protect humans, environment, equipment, and production
- the measures by which these regulations and requirements are fulfilled

### IEC 61508 Description

The technical standard defining the requirements for Safety-Related Systems is

- the IEC 61508.

It deals with the Functional Safety of electrical, electronic or programmable electronic Safety-Related Systems. A Safety-Related System is a system that is required to perform 1 or more specific functions to ensure risks are kept at an acceptable level. Such functions are defined as Safety Functions. A system is defined functionally Safe if random, systematic, and common cause failures do not lead to malfunctioning of the system and do not result in injury or death of humans, spills to the environment and loss of equipment and production.

The standard defines a generic approach to all lifecycle activities for systems that are used to perform Safety Functions. It constitutes procedures to be used for the design, the development, and the validation of both hardware and software applied in Safety-Related Systems. Further, it determines rules concerning both the management of Functional Safety and documentation.

### IEC 61511 Description

The Functional Safety requirements defined in the IEC 61508 are refined specifically for the process industry sector in the following technical standard:

- the IEC 61511: Functional safety - safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector

This standard guides the user in the application of a Safety-Related System, starting from the earliest phase of a project, continuing through the start up, covering modifications and eventual decommissioning activities. In summary, it deals with the Safety Lifecycle of all components of a Safety-Related System used in the process industry.

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## Risk Description

The IEC 61508 is based on the concepts of risk analysis and Safety Function. The risk depends on severity and probability. It can be reduced to a tolerable level by applying a Safety Function that consists of an electrical, electronic or programmable electronic system. Further, it should be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

In summary, the IEC 61508 views risks as follows:

- Zero risk can never be reached.
- Safety must be considered from the beginning.
- Intolerable risks must be reduced.

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## SIL Policy

### Introduction

The SIL value evaluates the robustness of an application against failures, thus indicating the ability of a system to perform a Safety Function within a defined probability. The IEC 61508 specifies 4 levels of Safety performance depending on the risk or impacts caused by the process for which the Safety-Related System is used. The more dangerous the possible impacts are on community and environment, the higher the Safety requirements are to lower the risk.

### SIL Value Description

Discrete level (1 out of a possible 4) for specifying the Safety Integrity requirements of the Safety Functions to be allocated to the Safety-Related Systems, where Safety Integrity Level 4 has the highest level of Safety Integrity and Safety Integrity Level 1 has the lowest, see *SILs for Low Demand*, page 128.

### SIL Requirements Description

To achieve Functional Safety, 2 types of requirements are necessary:

- Safety Function requirements, defining what Safety Functions have to be performed
- Safety Integrity requirements, defining what degree of certainty is necessary that the Safety Functions are performed

The Safety Function requirements are derived from hazard analysis and the Safety Integrity ones from risk assessment.

They consist of the following quantities:

- Mean time between failures
- Probabilities of failure
- Failure rates
- Diagnostic coverage
- Safe failure fraction
- Hardware fault tolerance

Depending on the level of Safety Integrity, these quantities must range between defined limits.

---

## SIL Rating Description

As defined in the IEC 61508, the SIL value is limited by both the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and the hardware fault tolerance (HFT) of the subsystem that performs the Safety Function. A HFT of  $n$  means that  $n+1$  faults could cause a loss of the Safety Function, the Safe state cannot be entered. The SFF depends on failure rates and diagnostic coverage.

The following table shows the relation between SFF, HFT, and SIL for complex Safety-Related subsystems according to IEC 61508-2, in which the failure modes of all components cannot be completely defined:

SFF	HFT=0	HFT=1	HFT=2
$SFF \leq 60\%$	-	SIL1	SIL2
$60\% < SFF \leq 90\%$	SIL1	SIL2	SIL3
$90\% < SFF \leq 99\%$	SIL2	SIL3	SIL4
$SFF > 99\%$	SIL3	SIL4	SIL4

There are 2 ways to reach a certain Safety Integrity Level:

- via increasing the HFT by providing additional independent shutdown paths
- via increasing the SFF by additional diagnostics

## SIL-Demand Relation Description

The IEC 61508 distinguishes between low demand mode and high demand (or continuous) mode of operation.

In low demand mode, the frequency of demand for operation made on a Safety-Related System is not greater than 1 per year and not greater than twice the proof test frequency. The SIL value for a low demand Safety-Related System is related directly to its average probability of failure to perform its Safety Function on demand or, simply, probability of failure on demand (PFD).

In high demand or continuous mode, the frequency of demand for operation made on a Safety-Related System is greater than 1 per year and greater than twice the proof test frequency. The SIL value for a high demand Safety-Related System is related directly to its probability of a dangerous failure occurring per hour or, simply, probability of failure per hour (PFH).

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### SILs for Low Demand

The following table lists the requirements for a system in low demand mode of operation:

Safety Integrity Level	Probability of Failure on Demand
4	$\geq 10^{-5}$ to $< 10^{-4}$
3	$\geq 10^{-4}$ to $< 10^{-3}$
2	$\geq 10^{-3}$ to $< 10^{-2}$
1	$\geq 10^{-2}$ to $< 10^{-1}$

### SILs for High Demand

The following table lists the requirements for a system in high demand mode of operation:

Safety Integrity Level	Probability of Failure per Hour
4	$\geq 10^{-9}$ to $< 10^{-8}$
3	$\geq 10^{-8}$ to $< 10^{-7}$
2	$\geq 10^{-7}$ to $< 10^{-6}$
1	$\geq 10^{-6}$ to $< 10^{-5}$

For SIL3, the required probabilities of failure for the complete Safety integrated system are:

- PFD  $\geq 10^{-4}$  to  $< 10^{-3}$  for low demand
- PFH  $\geq 10^{-8}$  to  $< 10^{-7}$  for high demand



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
## Safety Loop Description

The Safety loop to which the Quantum Safety PLC consists of the following 3 parts:

- Sensors
- Quantum Safety PLC with Safety CPU and Safety I/O modules
- Actuators

A backplane or a remote connection with CRA/CRP do not destroy a Safety Loop. Backplanes, CRP and CRA modules are part of a “black channel”. This means that the data exchanged by I/O and PLC cannot be corrupted without detection by the receiver.

The following figure shows a typical Safety loop:



As shown in the figure above, the contribution of the PLC is only 10-20% because the probability of failure of sensors and actuators is usually quite high.

A conservative assumption of 10% for the Safety PLC’s contribution to the overall probability leaves more margin for the user and results in the following required probabilities of failure for the Safety PLC:

- $\text{PFD} \geq 10^{-5}$  to  $< 10^{-4}$  for low demand
- $\text{PFH} \geq 10^{-9}$  to  $< 10^{-8}$  for high demand

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## PFD Equation Description

The IEC 61508 assumes that half of the failures end in a Safe state. Therefore, the failure rate  $\lambda$  is divided into

- $\lambda_S$  - the safe failure and
- $\lambda_D$  - the dangerous failure, itself composed of
  - $\lambda_{DD}$  - dangerous failure detected by the internal diagnostic
  - $\lambda_{DU}$  - dangerous failure undetected.

The failure rate can be calculated by using the mean time between failures (MTBF), a module specific value, as follows:

$$\lambda = 1/\text{MTBF}$$

The equation for calculating the probability of failure on demand is:

$$\text{PFD}(t) = \lambda_{DU} \times t$$

t represents the time between 2 proof tests.

The probability of failure per hour implies a time interval of 1 hour. Therefore, the PFD equation is reduced to the following one:

$$\text{PFH} = \lambda_{DU}$$

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# System Objects



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## Introduction

This chapter describes the system bits and words of the Quantum Safety PLC.

**Note:** The symbols associated with each bit object or system word mentioned in the descriptive tables of these objects are not implemented as standard in the software, but can be entered using the data editor.

It is suggested that the symbol names associated with the system bits and system words that appear on the following pages be implemented to provide continuity and ease of understanding. Example: %S0 COLDSTART (the user can select another word to replace COLDSTART).

## What's in this Chapter?

This chapter contains the following sections:

Section	Topic	Page
B.1	System Bits	132
B.2	System Words	141

## B.1 System Bits

---

### Introduction

This section describes the system bits of the Quantum Safety PLC.

For your convenience, all system bits of standard Quantum PLCs are listed but only explained further if used in the Quantum Safety PLC.

### What's in this Section?

This section contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
System Bit Introduction	133
Description of the System Bits %S0 to %S13	134
Description of the System Bits %S15 to %S21	136
Description of the System Bits %S30 to %S51	138
Description of the System Bits %S59 to %S122	139

## System Bit Introduction

### General

The Quantum PLCs use %Si system bits which indicate the state of the PLC, or they can be used to control how it operates.

These bits can be tested in the user program to detect any functional development.

Some of these bits must be reset to their initial or normal state by either the program or the user. Other bits are automatically reset by the system. Finally, there are bits which only display the status of the PLC.

## Description of the System Bits %S0 to %S13

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the **Quant. Safety** column with no.

The following table gives a description of the system bits %S0 to %S13:

Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%S0</b> COLDSTART	cold start	Normally at 0, this bit is set to 1 by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● power restoration with loss of data (battery related),</li> <li>● the user program,</li> <li>● the terminal,</li> <li>● a change of cartridge,</li> </ul> <p>This bit is set to 1 during the first complete restored cycle of the PLC either in RUN or in STOP mode. It is reset to 0 by the system before the following cycle. %S0 is not always set in the first scan of the PLC. If a signal set for every start of the PLC is needed, %S21 should be used instead.</p>	1 (1 cycle)	no	yes
<b>%S1</b> WARMSTART	warm restart	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	no	no
<b>%S4</b> TB10MS	time base 10 ms	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	-	no	no
<b>%S5</b> TB100MS	time base 100 ms	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	-	no	no
<b>%S6</b> TB1SEC	time base 1 s	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	-	no	no
<b>%S7</b> TB1MIN	time base 1 min	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	-	no	no

Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%S10</b> IOERR	input/output fault	Normally at 1, this is set to 0 when an I/O fault on an in-rack module or device on Fipio is detected (e.g. non-compliant configuration, exchange fault, hardware fault, etc.). The %S10 bit is reset to 1 by the system as soon as the fault disappears.	1	no	yes
<b>%S11</b> WDG	watchdog overflow	Normally at 0, this is set to 1 by the system as soon as the task execution time becomes greater than the maximum execution time (i.e. the watchdog) declared in the task properties.	0	no	yes
<b>%S12</b> PLCRUNNING	PLC in RUN	This bit is set to 1 by the system when the PLC is in RUN. It is set to 0 by the system as soon as the PLC is no longer in RUN (STOP, INIT, etc.).	0	no	yes
<b>%S13</b> 1.RSTSCANRUN	first cycle after switching to RUN	Normally set to 0, this is set to 1 by the system during the first cycle of the master task after the PLC is set to RUN.	-	no	yes

## **WARNING**

### **UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION**

On Quantum Safety PLCs, communication interruptions from NOE, CRA or CRP modules are not reported on bit %S10.

Make certain that these system bits are used correctly.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

## Description of the System Bits %S15 to %S21

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the **Quant. Safety** column with no.

The following table gives a description of the system bits %S15 to %S21:

Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
%S15 STRINGERROR	character string fault	see chapter "System Bits" in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
%S16 IOERRTSK	task input/output fault	Normally set to 1, this bit is set to 0 by the system when a fault occurs on an in-rack I/O module or a Fipio device configured in the task. This bit must be reset to 1 by the user.	1	yes	yes
%S17 CARRY	rotate or shift output	normally at 0 During a rotate or shift operation, this bit takes the state of the outgoing bit.	0	no	yes
%S18 OVERFLOW	overflow or arithmetic error	Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 in the event of a capacity overflow if there is <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a result greater than + 32 767 or less than - 32 768, in single length,</li> <li>• result greater than + 65 535, in unsigned integer,</li> <li>• a result greater than + 2 147 483 647 or less than - 2 147 483 648, in double length,</li> <li>• result greater than +4 294 967 296, in double length or unsigned integer,</li> <li>• real values outside limits,</li> <li>• division by 0,</li> <li>• the root of a negative number,</li> <li>• forcing to a non-existent step on a drum,</li> <li>• stacking up of an already full register, emptying of an already empty register.</li> </ul> It must be tested by the user program after each operation where there is a risk of overflow, and then reset to 0 by the user if there is indeed an overflow. When the %S18 bit switches to 1, the application stops in error state if the %S78 bit has been set to 1.	0	yes	yes
%S19 OVERRUN	task period overrun (periodical scanning)	Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 by the system in the event of a time period overrun (i.e. task execution time is greater than the period defined by the user in the configuration or programmed into the %SW word associated with the task). The user must reset this bit to 0. Each task manages its own %S19 bit.	0	yes	yes



Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%S20</b> INDEXOVF	Index overflow	Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 when the address of the indexed object becomes less than 0 or exceeds the number of objects declared in the configuration. In this case, it is as if the index were equal to 0. It must be tested by the user program after each operation where there is a risk of overflow, and then reset to 0 if there is indeed an overflow. When the %S20 bit switches to 1, the application stops in error state if the %S78 bit has been set to 1.	0	yes	no
<b>%S21</b> 1RSTASKRUN	first task cycle	Tested in a task (Mast, Fast, Aux0, Aux1, Aux2, Aux3), the bit %S21 indicates the first cycle of this task. %S21 is set to 1 at the start of the cycle and reset to zero at the end of the cycle. <b>Notes:</b> The bit %S21 does not have the same meaning in PL7 as in Unity Pro.	0	no	yes

## WARNING

### UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION

On Quantum Safety PLCs, communication interruptions from NOE, CRA or CRP modules are not reported on bit %S16.

Make certain that these system bits are used correctly.

**Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.**

## Description of the System Bits %S30 to %S51

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the **Quant. Safety** column with no.

The following table gives a description of the system bits %S30 to %S51:

Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
%S30 MASTACT	activation/deactivation of the master task	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	1	yes	no
%S31 FASTACT	activation/deactivation of the fast task	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
%S32 %S33 %S34 %S35	activation/deactivation of the auxiliary tasks 0-3	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
%S38 ACTIVEVT	enabling/inhibition of events	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	1	yes	no
%S39 EVTQVR	saturation in event processing	see chapter "System Bits" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
%S50 RTCWRITE	updating of time and date via words %SW50 to %SW53	Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 by the program or the terminal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● set to 0: update of system words %SW50 to %SW53 by the date and time supplied by the PLC real-time clock,</li> <li>● set to 1: system words %SW50 to %SW53 are no longer updated, therefore making it possible to modify them.</li> <li>● The switch from 1 to 0 updates the real-time clock with the values entered in words %SW50 to %SW53.</li> </ul>	0	yes	yes
%S51 RTCERR	time loss in real-time clock	This system-managed bit set to 1 indicates that the real-time clock is missing or that its system words (%SW50 to %SW53) are meaningless. If set to 1, the clock must be reset to the correct time.	-	no	yes

## Description of the System Bits %S59 to %S122

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the **Quant. Safety** column with no.

The following table gives a description of the system bits %S59 to %S122:

Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
%S59 RTCTUNING	incremental update of the time and date via word %SW59	Normally set to 0, this bit can be set to 1 or 0 by the program or the terminal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>set to 0: the system does not manage the system word %SW59,</li> <li>set to 1: the system manages edges on word %SW59 to adjust the date and current time (by increment).</li> </ul>	0	yes	yes
%S67 PCMCIABAT0	state of the application memory card battery	This bit is used to monitor the status of the main battery when the memory card is in the upper PCMCIA slot (all the Atriums, Premiums, and on the Quantums): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>set to 1: main voltage battery is low (application is preserved but you must replace the battery following the so-called predictive maintenance procedure),</li> <li>set to 0: main battery voltage is sufficient (application is preserved).</li> </ul> Bit %S67 is managed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>on the PV06 small and medium capacity RAM memory cards (product version written on the card label), i.e. offering memory size under Unity =#768K: TSX MRP P 128K, TSX MRP P 224K TSX MCP C 224K, MCP C 512K, TSX MRP P 384K, TSX MRP C 448K, TSX MRP C 768K,</li> <li>under Unity whose version is <math>\geq 2.02</math>.</li> </ul>	-	no	yes
%S68 PLCBAT	state of the processor battery	This bit is used to check the operating state of the backup battery for saving data and the program in RAM: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>set to 0: battery present and operational,</li> <li>set to 1: battery missing or non-operational.</li> </ul>	-	no	yes
%S75 PCMCIABAT1	state of the data storage memory card battery	This bit is used to monitor the status of the main battery when the memory card is in the lower PCMCIA slot, see chapter "System Bits" in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i> . <b>Note:</b> Data stored on a memory card in slot B are not processed in SIL3 projects.	-	no	no

## System Objects

Bit Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%S76</b> DIAGBUFFCONF	configured diagnostics buffer	This bit is set to 1 by the system when the diagnostics option has been configured. Then, a diagnostics buffer for storage of errors found by diagnostics DFBs is reserved. This bit is read-only.	0	no	yes
<b>%S77</b> DIAGBUFFFULL	full diagnostics buffer	This bit is set to 1 by the system when the buffer that receives errors from the diagnostics function blocks is full. This bit is read-only.	0	no	yes
<b>%S78</b> HALTIFERROR	stop in the event of error	Normally at 0, this bit can be set to 1 by the user, to program a PLC stop on application fault: %S15, %S18, %20.	0	yes	yes
<b>%S80</b> RSTMSGCNT	reset message counters	Normally set to 0, this bit can be set to 1 by the user to reset the message counters %SW80 to %SW86.	0	yes	yes
<b>%S94</b> SAVECURVAL	saving adjustment values	see chapter "System Bits" in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
<b>%S118</b> REMIOERR	General Remote I/O fault	Normally set to 1, this bit is set to 0 by the system when a fault occurs on a device connected to the RIO (Fipio for Premium or Drop S908 for Quantum) remote input/output bus. This bit is reset to 1 by the system when the fault disappears. This bit is not updated if an error occurs on the other buses (DIO, ProfiBus, ASI).	–	no	yes
<b>%S119</b> LOCIOERR	General inrack I/O fault	Normally set to 1, this bit is set to 0 by the system when a fault occurs on an I/O module placed in 1 of the racks. This bit is reset to 1 by the system when the fault disappears.	–	no	yes
<b>%S120</b> <b>%S121</b> <b>%S122</b>	DIO bus faults	see chapter "System Bits" in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	–	no	no

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## B.2 System Words

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### Introduction

This section describes the system words of the Quantum Safety PLC.

For your convenience, all system words of standard Quantum PLCs are listed but only explained further if used in the Quantum Safety PLC.

### What's in this Section?

This section contains the following topics:

Topic	Page
Description of the System Words %SW0 to %SW21	142
Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59	145
Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127	148

## Description of the System Words %SW0 to %SW21

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system words can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system words are marked in the **Quant. Safety** column with no.

The following table gives a description of the system words %SW0 to %SW21:

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW0</b> MASTPERIOD	master task scanning period	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
<b>%SW1</b> FASTPERIOD	fast task scanning period	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
<b>%SW2, %SW3, %SW4, %SW5</b>	auxiliary task scanning period	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
<b>%SW8</b> TSKINHIBIN	acquisition of task input monitoring	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
<b>%SW9</b> TSKINHIBOUT	monitoring of task output update	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no
<b>%SW10</b> TSKINIT	first cycle after cold start	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	no	no
<b>%SW11</b> WDGVALUE	watchdog duration	Reads the duration of the watchdog. The duration is expressed in milliseconds (10...1500 ms). This word cannot be modified.	-	no	yes

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW12</b> APMODE	mode of application processor	This word indicates the operating mode of the application processor. Possible values are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 16#A501: application processor is in Maintenance Mode.</li> <li>● 16#5AFE: application processor is in Safety Mode.</li> </ul> Any other value is interpreted as an error. This system word is not available for the standard Quantum CPU.	16#A501	no	yes
<b>%SW13</b> INTELMODE	mode of Intel processor	This word indicates the operating mode of the Intel Pentium processor. Possible values are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 16#501A: application processor is in Maintenance Mode.</li> <li>● 16#5AFE: application processor is in Safety Mode.</li> </ul> Any other value is interpreted as an error. This system word is not available for the standard Quantum CPU.	16#501A	no	yes
<b>%SW14</b> OSCOMMVERS	commercial version of PLC processor	This word contains the commercial version of the PLC processor. <b>Example:</b> 16#0135 version: 01; issue number: 35	-	no	yes
<b>%SW15</b> OSCOMPATCH	PLC processor patch version	This word contains the commercial version of the PLC processor patch. It is coded onto the least significant byte of the word. coding: 0 = no patch, 1 = A, 2 = B... <b>Example:</b> 16#0003 corresponds to patch C.	-	no	yes
<b>%SW16</b> OSINTVERS	firmware version number	This word contains the Firmware version number in hexadecimal of the PLC processor firmware. <b>Example:</b> 16#0017 version: 2.1; VN: 17	-	no	yes
<b>%SW17</b> FLOATSTAT	error status on floating operation	see chapter "System Objects" ( <i>see Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i> %SW17.1: Flag not managed by Quantum Safety.	0	yes	yes

System Objects

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW18</b> <b>%SW19</b> 100MSCOUNTER	absolute time counter	%SW18 is the low and %SW19 the high word for calculating durations. Both are incremented every 1/10th of a second by the system (even when the PLC is in STOP, they are no longer incremented if it is powered down). They can be read and written by the user program or by the terminal.	0	yes	yes
<b>%SW20</b> <b>%SW21</b> MSCOUNTER	absolute time counter	The low word %SW20 and the high word %SW21 are incremented every 1/1000th of a second by the system (even when the PLC is in STOP, they are no longer incremented if it is powered down). They can be read by the user program or by the terminal. %SW20 and %SW21 are reset on a cold start, but not on a warm start.	0	no	yes



## Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system words can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system words are marked in the **Quant. Safety** column with no.

The following table gives a description of the system words %SW30 to %SW59:

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW30</b> MASTCURRTIME	master task execution time	This word indicates the execution time of the last master task cycle (in ms).	-	no	no
<b>%SW31</b> MASTMAXTIME	maximum master task execution time	This word indicates the longest master task execution time since the last cold start (in ms).	-	no	yes
<b>%SW32</b> MASTMINTIME	minimum master task execution time	This word indicates the shortest master task execution time since the last cold start (in ms).	-	no	yes
<b>%SW33</b> <b>%SW34</b> <b>%SW35</b>	fast task execution times	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	-	no	no
<b>%SW36 to</b> <b>%SW47</b>	auxiliary tasks execution times	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	-	no	no
<b>%SW48</b> IOEVTNB	number of events	see chapter "System Objects" (see <i>Unity Pro, Program Languages and Structure, Reference Manual</i> ) in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0	yes	no

System Objects

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW49</b> DAYOFWEEK  <b>%SW50</b> SEC  <b>%SW51</b> HOURMIN  <b>%SW52</b> MONTHDAY  <b>%SW53</b> YEAR	real-time clock function	System words containing date and current time (in BCD): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW49: day of the week:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 1 = Monday,</li> <li>● 2 = Tuesday,</li> <li>● 3 = Wednesday,</li> <li>● 4 = Thursday,</li> <li>● 5 = Friday,</li> <li>● 6 = Saturday,</li> <li>● 7 = Sunday,</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW50: Seconds (16#SS00),</li> <li>● %SW51: Hours and Minutes (16#HHMM),</li> <li>● %SW52: Month and Day (16#MMDD),</li> <li>● %SW53: Year (16#YYYY).</li> </ul> <p>These words are managed by the system when the bit %S50 is set to 0.</p> <p>These words can be written by the user program or by the terminal when the bit %S50 is set to 1.</p>	-	yes	yes

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW54</b> STOPSEC  <b>%SW55</b> STOPHM  <b>%SW56</b> STOPMD  <b>%SW57</b> STOPYEAR  <b>%SW58</b> STOPDAY	real-time clock function on last stop	System words containing date and time of the last power outage or PLC stop (in Binary Coded Decimal): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW54: Seconds (00SS),</li> <li>● %SW55: Hours and Minutes (HHMM),</li> <li>● %SW56: Month and Day (MMDD),</li> <li>● %SW57: Year (YYYY),</li> <li>● %SW58: the most significant byte contains the day of the week (1 for Monday through to 7 for Sunday), and the least significant byte contains the code for the last stop:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 1 = change from RUN to STOP by the terminal or the dedicated input,</li> <li>● 2 = stop by watchdog (PLC task or SFC overrun),</li> <li>● 4 = power outage or memory card lock operation,</li> <li>● 5 = stop on hardware fault,</li> <li>● 6 = stop on software fault. Details on the type of software fault are stored in %SW125.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	-	no	yes
<b>%SW59</b> ADDDATETIME	adjustment of current date	Contains 2 8-bit series to adjust the current date. The action is performed on the rising edge of the bit. This word is enabled by bit %S59=1. In the following illustration, bits in the left column increment the value, and bits in the right column decrement the value:  	0	yes	yes

## Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127

### Detailed Description

**NOTE:** Not all of the system words can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system words are marked **no** in the **Quant. Safety** column.

The following table gives a description of the system words %SW60 to %SW127:

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
%SW60 HSB_CMD	Quantum Hot Standby command register	Meaning of the different bits of the word %SW60: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW60 . 0=1 invalidates the commands entered in the display (keypad).</li> <li>● %SW60 . 1               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 sets PLC A to OFFLINE mode.</li> <li>● =1 sets PLC A to RUN mode.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW60 . 2               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 sets PLC B to OFFLINE mode.</li> <li>● =1 sets PLC B to RUN mode.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW60 . 3=0 forces Standby PLC to OFFLINE mode if the applications are different.</li> <li>● %SW60 . 4               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 authorizes an update of the firmware only after the application has stopped.</li> <li>● =1 authorizes an update of the firmware without the application stopping.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW60 . 5=1 application transfer request from the Standby to the primary.</li> <li>● %SW60 . 8               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 address switch on Modbus port 1 during a primary swap.</li> <li>● =1 no address switch on Modbus port 1 during a primary swap.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	0	no	yes

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW61</b> HSB_STS	Quantum status register	<p>Meaning of the different bits of the word %SW61:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW61.0 und %SW61.1 PLC operating mode bits: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW61.1=0, %SW61.0=1: OFFLINE mode.</li> <li>● %SW61.1=1, %SW61.0=0: primary mode.</li> <li>● %SW61.1=1, %SW61.0=1: secondary mode (Standby).</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.2 and %SW61.3 operating mode bits from the other PLC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW61.3=0, %SW61.2=1: OFFLINE mode.</li> <li>● %SW61.3=1, %SW61.2=0: primary mode.</li> <li>● %SW61.3=1, %SW61.2=1: secondary mode (Standby).</li> <li>● %SW61.3=0, %SW61.2=0: the remote PLC is not accessible (switched off, no communication).</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.4=0 the applications are identical on both PLCs.</li> <li>● %SW61.5 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 the PLC is used as unit A.</li> <li>● =1 the PLC is used as unit B.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.7 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 same PLC OS version.</li> <li>● =1 different PLC OS version.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.8 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 same Copro OS version.</li> <li>● =1 different Copro OS version.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.12 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 information given by bit 13 is not relevant.</li> <li>● =1 information given by bit 13 is valid.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.13 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 NOE address set to IP.</li> <li>● =1 NOE address set to IP + 1.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● %SW61.15 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● =0 Hot Standby not activated.</li> <li>● =1 Hot Standby activated.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	0	no	yes

## System Objects

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW62</b> HSBY_REVERSE0 <b>%SW63</b> HSBY_REVERSE1	transfer word	These 2 words may be written by the user in the first section of the master task. They are then transferred automatically from the Standby processor to update the primary PLC. They may be read on the primary PLC and be used as primary application parameters.	0	yes	no
<b>%SW70</b> WEEKOFYEAR	real-time clock function	System word containing the number of the week in the year: 1 to 52.	–		yes
<b>%SW71</b> KEY_SWITCH	position of the switches on the Quantum front panel	This word provides the image of the positions of the switches on the front panel of the Quantum processor. This word is updated automatically by the system. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW71.0 = 1 switch in the "Memory protected" position,</li> <li>● %SW71.1 = 1 switch in the "STOP" position,</li> <li>● %SW71.2 = 1 switch in the "START" position,</li> <li>● %SW71.8 = 1 switch in the "MEM" position,</li> <li>● %SW71.9 = 1 switch in the "ASCII" position,</li> <li>● %SW71.10 = 1 switch in the "RTU" position,</li> <li>● %SW71.3 to 7 and 11 to 15 are not used.</li> </ul>	0	no	yes
<b>%SW75</b> TIMEREVTNB	timer-type event counter	see chapter "System Objects" in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i>	0		no
<b>%SW76</b> DLASTREG	diagnostics function: recording	Result of the last registration: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● = 0 if the recording was successful,</li> <li>● = 1 if the diagnostics buffer has not been configured,</li> <li>● = 2 if the diagnostics buffer is full.</li> </ul>	0		yes
<b>%SW77</b> DLASTDEREG	diagnostics function: non-recording	Result of the last deregistration: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● = 0 if the non-recording was successful,</li> <li>● = 1 if the diagnostics buffer has not been configured,</li> <li>● = 21 if the error identifier is invalid,</li> <li>● = 22 if the error has not been recorded.</li> </ul>	0		yes
<b>%SW78</b> DNBERRBUF	diagnostics function: number of errors	Number of errors currently in the diagnostics buffer.	0		yes

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW80</b> MSGCNT0  <b>%SW81</b> MSCNT1	message management	These words are updated by the system, and can also be reset using %S80. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• %SW80: Number of Modbus messages sent by the system as client on all communication ports except USB and Ethernet copro.</li> </ul> <b>NOTE:</b> Modbus messages sent by the system as Master are not counted in this word. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• %SW81: Number of Modbus messages received by the system as client on all communication ports except USB and Ethernet copro.</li> </ul> <b>NOTE:</b> Modbus messages received as response to the requests sent by the system, as Master, are not counted in this word.	0	yes	yes
<b>%SW87</b> MSTSERCNT	communication flow management	Number of requests processed by synchronous server per master (MAST) task cycle.	0		yes
<b>%SW90</b> MAXREQNB	maximum number of requests processed per master task cycle	This word is used to set a maximum number of requests which can be processed by the PLC per master task cycle. When the CPU is the server: This number of requests must be between 2 (minimum) and N+4 (maximum). N: number differs depending on the model. When the CPU is the client: N: number differs depending on the model. The value 0 does not work. If a value that is outside of the range is entered, it is the value N that is taken into account. See also chapter "System Objects" in the <i>Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual</i> .	0	yes	yes
<b>%SW108</b> FORCEDIOIM	number of forced I/O module bits	This system word counts the number of forced I/O module bits. This word is incremented for every forcing, and decremented for every unforcing.	0	no	yes
<b>%SW110</b>	number of unrestricted memory area for %M	This system word gives information on the size of the unrestricted memory area for %M. This system word is not available for the standard Quantum CPU.	–	no	yes
<b>%SW111</b>	number of unrestricted memory area for %MW	This system word gives information on the size of the unrestricted memory area for %MW. This system word is not available for the standard Quantum CPU.	–	no	yes

## System Objects

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Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW124</b> CPUERR	type of system fault	<p>This system word is updated if the PLC is set to error state.</p> <p>The possible values are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 0x0065: execution of HALT instruction impossible</li> <li>● 0x0080: system watchdog</li> </ul> <p>If the PLC is set to Safety error state, the content of %SW125 is updated and can be read after the next restart of the PLC (see below).</p>	–	no	yes



Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW125</b> BLKERRTYPE	last fault detected	<p>The code of the last fault detected is given in this word. The following error codes cause the PLC to stop if %S78 is set to 1. %S15, %S18 and %S20 are activated independently of %S78:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 16#0002: PCMCIA signature not verified</li> <li>● 16#2258: execution of HALT instruction</li> <li>● 16#2302: call to a not supported system function in a user function block</li> <li>● 16#9690: error of application CRC detected in background</li> <li>● 16#DE87: calculation error on floating-point numbers (%S18, these errors are listed in the word %SW17)</li> <li>● 16#DEB0: watchdog overflow (%S11)</li> <li>● 16#DEF1: character string transfer error (%S15)</li> <li>● 16#DEF2: arithmetic or division by 0 error (%S18)</li> <li>● 16#DEF3: index overflow (%S20)</li> </ul> <p><b>Note:</b> The codes 16#8xxx and 16#7xxx do not stop the application and indicate an error on function blocks.</p> <p>In case of a SIL3 related error, the PLC stops. After power off and restart of the PLC, %SW 125 contains the code of the cause of the error:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● 0x5AF1: sequence check error (unpredictable execution in CPU)</li> <li>● 0x5AF2: error in memory (corrupt address)</li> <li>● 0x5AF3: comparison error (execution results of Intel and application processor differ)</li> <li>● 0x5AF4: real-time clock error</li> <li>● 0x5AF5: error initializing double code execution</li> <li>● 0x5AF6: watchdog activation error</li> <li>● 0x5AF7: error during memory check (takes more than 8 hours)</li> <li>● 0x5AF8: error in memory check (corrupt RAM)</li> </ul> <p><b>Note:</b> %SW125 is only reset after <code>init</code> or complete download or restart (it always contains the last fault detected).</p>	–	no	yes


## System Objects

Word Symbol	Function	Description	Initial State	Write Access	Quant. Safety
<b>%SW126</b> ERRADDR0 <b>%SW127</b> ERRADDR1	blocking fault instruction address	Address of the instruction that generated the application blocking fault. For 16 bit processors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW126 contains the offset for this address,</li> <li>● %SW127 contains the segment number for this address.</li> </ul> For 32 bit processors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● %SW126 contains the least significant word for this address,</li> <li>● %SW127 contains the most significant word for this address.</li> </ul> The content of %SW126 and %SW127 is for Schneider Electric use only.	0	no	yes

For the description of the system words %SW128 to %SW339 and %SW535 to %SW640, see the chapter "Quantum Specific System Words" in the *Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual*. The system words %SW340 to %SW534 are not used in Quantum Safety PLCs.

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# Glossary



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## 0-9

!

**NOTE:** For terms taken from the IEC 61508 standard, refer to the standard for complete definitions.

### **1002D diagnostic configuration**

X out of Y


For example 1 out of 2. Voting and redundancy capacity of a Safety-Related System.

D in 1oo2D refers to diagnostics. Hence, D in 1oo2D means 1 out of 2 with diagnostics.

## A

### ALARP

as low as is reasonably practicable  
(Definition IEC 61508)



## C

### CCF

common cause failure  
failure, which is the result of 1 or more events, causing coincident failures of 2 or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure  
(Definition IEC 61508)  
The common cause factor in a dual channel system is the crucial factor for the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for the whole system.

**cold start**

Cold start refers to starting the computer from power off.

**CPU**

central processing unit

**CRC**

cyclic redundancy check

**D****DC**

diagnostic coverage

fractional decrease in the probability of dangerous hardware failures resulting from the operation of the automatic diagnostic tests

(Definition IEC 61508)

The fraction of the possible dangerous failures  $\lambda_D$  is divided into failures which are detected by diagnostics and failures which remain undetected.

$$\lambda_D = \lambda_{DD} + \lambda_{DU}$$

The diagnostic coverage (DC) defines the fraction of the dangerous failures which are detected.

$$\lambda_{DD} = \lambda_D \cdot DC$$

$$\lambda_{DU} = \lambda_D (1 - DC)$$

The definition may also be represented in terms of the following equation, where DC is the diagnostic coverage,  $\lambda_{DD}$  is the probability of detected dangerous failures and  $\lambda_{Dtotal}$  is the probability of total dangerous failures:

$$DC = \frac{\sum \lambda_{DD}}{\sum \lambda_{Dtotal}}$$

**DDT**

derived data type

A derived data type is user defined.

**DFB**

derived function block

**DIO**

distributed input/output

**DLL**

dynamic link library

**E**

**E/E/PES**

electrical/electronic/programmable electronic system  
(Definition IEC 61508)

System for control, protection or monitoring based on 1 or more electrical/electronic programmable electronic (E/E/PE) devices. This includes elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.

**EDT**

elementary data type  
An elementary data type is predefined.

**EF**

elementary function

**EFB**

elementary function block

**EMC**

electromagnetic compatibility  
The term refers to the origin, control, and measurement of electromagnetic effects on electronic systems.

**EN**

European Norm  
This is the official European standard.

**error**

discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition  
(Definition IEC 61508)

**ESD**

emergency shutdown

**EUC**

equipment under control  
(Definition IEC 61508)  
This term designates equipment, machinery, apparatuses or plants used for manufacturing, process, transportation, medical or other activities.

**F****failure**

termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function  
(Definition IEC 61508)

**fault**

abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function  
(Definition IEC 61508)

**FBD**

functional block diagram  
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.

**FFB**

function/function block

**FMEA**

failure modes and effects analysis

**FMECA**

failure modes and effects criticality analysis

**Functional Safety**

part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system which depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities

(Definition IEC 61508)

A system is defined functionally Safe if random, systematic and common cause failures do not lead to malfunctioning of the system and do not result in injury or death of humans, spills to the environment and loss of equipment or production:

- Functional Safety deals with the part of the overall Safety that depends on the correct functioning of the Safety-Related System.
- Functional Safety applies to products as well as organizations.

**H**

**HALT**

high accelerated life tests

**HFT**

hardware fault tolerance

(Definition IEC 61508)

A hardware fault tolerance of N means that N + 1 faults could cause a loss of the Safety Function, for instance:

- HFT = 0: The 1st failure could cause a loss of the Safety Function
- HFT = 1: 2 faults in combination could cause a loss of the Safety Function. (There are 2 different paths to go to a Safe state. Loss of the Safety Function means that a Safe state cannot be entered.

**HMI**

human-machine interface



**HSBY**

Hot Standby

**I****IEC**

International Electrotechnical Commission

**IEC 61508**

The IEC 61508 standard is an international standard that addresses Functional Safety of electrical / electronic / programmable electronic Safety-Related Systems. It applies to any kind of Safety-Related System in any industry wherever there are no product standards.

**IL**

instruction list

This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.

**L****LCD**

liquid crystal display

**LD**

ladder diagram

This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.

**M****MTBF**

mean time between failures

**MTTF**

mean time to failure

**MTTR**

mean time to repair

**N**

**NFPA**

National Fire Protection Association

This is a body for establishing codes and standards for fire protection, electrical and machine Safety in the U.S.

**non-interfering module**

Non-interfering modules are modules that are not directly used to control the Safety Function. They do not interfere with the Safety modules (either during normal operation or if there is a fault).

**P**

**PELV**

protected extra low voltage

**PES**

programmable electronic system

(Definition IEC 61508)

System for control, protection or monitoring based on 1 or more programmable electronic devices, including elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.

PES is another term for a computer control system or PLC.

**PFD**

probability of failure on demand

(Definition IEC 61508)

For a single channel system the average probability of a failure on demand is calculated as follows:

$$PFD(t)_{Av} = \frac{1}{2} \lambda_{DU} \cdot t$$

For a dual channel system the average probability of a failure on demand is calculated as follows:

$$PFD(t)_{Av} = \lambda_{DUCH1} \cdot \lambda_{DUCH2} \cdot t^2 + CC$$

For a dual channel system, also the Common Cause effect (CC) must be considered. The common cause effect ranges from 1% to 10% of  $PFD_{CH1}$  and  $PFD_{CH2}$ . (=1/RRF).

**PFH**

probability of failure per hour

(Definition IEC 61508)

**PLC**

programmable logic controller

**project**

A project is a user application in Unity Pro XLS.

**proof test**

periodic test performed to detect failures in a safety-related system so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to an "as new" condition or as close as practical to this condition

(Definition IEC 61508)

**proof test interval**

The proof test interval is the time period between proof tests.

**PRT**

PLC reaction time

The PLC Reaction Time is the time which passes between a signal is detected at the input module terminal and the reaction is set at the output module terminal.

**PS**

power supply

**PST**

process safety time

The process safety time is defined as the period of time between a failure occurring in EUC or the EUC control system (with the potential to give rise to a hazardous event) and the occurrence of the hazardous event if the safety function is not performed.

(Definition IEC 61508)

**Q**

**QSE**

environment system qualification

**R**

**RAM**

random access memory

**random hardware failure**

failure, occurring at a random time, which results from 1 or more of the possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware

(Definition IEC 61508)

**RIO**

remote input/output

**risk**

combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm  
(Definition IEC 61508)

Risk is calculated using the following equation:  $R=S*H$

The letters stand for:


<b>Letter</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
R	risk
S	extent of the damage
H	frequency of occurrence of the damage

**RM**

requirements management

**RRF**

risk reduction factor  
 (Definition IEC 61508)  
 The risk reduction factor equals 1/PFD.



**RTC**

real-time clock

**S**

**Safety Function**

function to be implemented by an E/E/PE safety-related system, other technology safety-related system or external risk reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC, in respect of a specific hazardous event  
 (Definition IEC 61508)

**Safety Integrity**

probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time  
(Definition IEC 61508)

**Safety PLC**

Quantum Safety PLC (140 CPU 651 60S or 140 CPU 671 60S)

**Safety variable**

variable used to implement a Safety Function in a Safety-Related System

**Safety-Related System**

This term designates a system that both

- implements the required Safety Functions necessary to achieve or maintain a Safe state for the EUC and
- is intended to achieve, on its own or using other E/E/PE Safety-Related Systems, other technology Safety-Related Systems, or external risk reduction facilities, the necessary Safety Integrity for the required Safety Functions.

**SFC**

sequential function chart  
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.

**SFF**

safe failure fraction

**SFR**

Safety Functional requirement  
Safety Functional requirements are derived from the hazard analysis and define what the function does, for instance the Safety Function to be performed.

**SIL**

**NOTE:** For complete definitions and parameters related to SIL ratings refer to IEC 61508, "Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems". Provided here is a partial definition.

safety integrity level

discrete level (1 out of a possible 4) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest

(Definition IEC 61508)

**SIL2 project (application)**

A project (application) that uses a Quantum Safety PLC (140 CPU 651 60S V1.00 or 140 CPU 671 60S V1.00) to implement Safety Functions in a Safety-Related System.

**SIL3 project (application)**

A project (application) that uses a Quantum Safety PLC (140 CPU 651 60S V2.00 or 140 CPU 671 60S V2.00) to implement Safety Functions in a Safety-Related System.

**SIR**

Safety Integrity requirement

Safety Integrity requirements are derived from a risk assessment and describe the likelihood of a Safety Function to be performed satisfactorily, for instance the degree of certainty necessary for the Safety Function to be carried out.

**sniffing**

reading the configuration out of a PLC

**SRS**

safety requirements specification

specification containing all the requirements of the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems

(Definition IEC 61508)



**SSC**

system Safety concept

This is a detailed description of the system architecture, configuration and diagnostics required to achieve Functional Safety.

**ST**

structured text

This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.

**Statement of Consequence**

This is the last line within all special messages. It begins with "**Failure to follow these instructions...**"

**systematic failure**

failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors

(Definition IEC 61508)

**T****TÜV**

Technischer Überwachungsverein

(German for Association for Technical Inspection)

**U****UMA**

unrestricted memory area

It is a specially dedicated memory area for bits and words which is not write protected.

## V

### VDE

Verband Deutscher Elektroingenieure  
This is the German equivalent of the IEEE.

## W

### warm start


Warm start refers to restarting the computer without turning the power off.





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# Index



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## Symbols

<i>%S0, 134</i>	<i>%S6, 134</i>
<i>%S1, 134</i>	<i>%S67, 139</i>
<i>%S10, 135</i>	<i>%S68, 139</i>
<i>%S11, 135</i>	<i>%S7, 134</i>
<i>%S118, 140</i>	<i>%S75, 139</i>
<i>%S119, 140</i>	<i>%S76, 140</i>
<i>%S12, 135</i>	<i>%S77, 140</i>
<i>%S120, 140</i>	<i>%S78, 140</i>
<i>%S121, 140</i>	<i>%S80, 140</i>
<i>%S122, 140</i>	<i>%S94, 140</i>
<i>%S13, 135</i>	<i>%SW0, 142</i>
<i>%S15, 136</i>	<i>%SW1, 142</i>
<i>%S16, 136</i>	<i>%SW10, 142</i>
<i>%S17, 136</i>	<i>%SW11, 142</i>
<i>%S18, 136</i>	<i>%SW12, 143</i>
<i>%S19, 136</i>	<i>%SW13, 143</i>
<i>%S20, 137</i>	<i>%SW14, 143</i>
<i>%S21, 137</i>	<i>%SW15, 143</i>
<i>%S30, 138</i>	<i>%SW16, 143</i>
<i>%S31, 138</i>	<i>%SW17, 143</i>
<i>%S32, 138</i>	<i>%SW18, 144</i>
<i>%S33, 138</i>	<i>%SW19, 144</i>
<i>%S34, 138</i>	<i>%SW2, 142</i>
<i>%S35, 138</i>	<i>%SW20, 144</i>
<i>%S38, 138</i>	<i>%SW21, 144</i>
<i>%S39, 138</i>	<i>%SW3, 142</i>
<i>%S4, 134</i>	<i>%SW30, 145</i>
<i>%S5, 134</i>	<i>%SW31, 145</i>
<i>%S50, 138</i>	<i>%SW32, 145</i>
<i>%S51, 138</i>	<i>%SW33, 145</i>
<i>%S59, 139</i>	<i>%SW34, 145</i>
	<i>%SW35, 145</i>

%SW36 to %SW47, 145  
%SW4, 142  
%SW48, 145  
%SW49, 146  
%SW5, 142  
%SW50, 146  
%SW51, 146  
%SW52, 146  
%SW53, 146  
%SW54, 147  
%SW55, 147  
%SW56, 147  
%SW57, 147  
%SW58, 147  
%SW59, 147  
%SW8, 142  
%SW81, 151  
%SW9, 142

## 0-9

100MSCOUNTER, 144  
1RSTSCANRUN, 135  
1RSTTASKRUN, 137  
61508  
    IEC, 124  
61511  
    IEC, 124

## A

ACTIVEVT, 138  
ADJDATETIME, 147  
APMODE, 143  
application password, 83  
    loss of, 83  
auto-lock, 78  
Automatic start in Run, 88, 95  
automatic swap, 27

## B

BLKERRTYPE, 153

## C

CARRY, 136  
checklist  
    for configuring Safety-Related Systems, 110  
    for I/O modules, 114  
    for operation, maintenance, and repair, 116  
    for programming SIL3 applications, 112  
cold start, 25, 95  
COLDSTART, 134  
CPUERR, 152  
CRC (cyclic redundancy check), 34, 94  
cyclic redundancy check (CRC), 34, 94

## D

DAYOFWEEK, 146  
DIAGBUFFCONF, 140  
DIAGBUFFFULL, 140  
diagnostics, 24  
DLASTDEREG, 150  
DLASTREG, 150  
DLL (dynamic link library), 94  
DNBERRBUF, 150  
double code execution, 34  
double code generation, 34  
dynamic link library (DLL), 94

## E

ERRADDRi, 154  
EVTOVR, 138

## F

failure rate, 130  
FASTACT, 138  
FASTPERIOD, 142  
firmware, 20, 22  
FLOATSTAT, 143  
FORCEDIOIM, 151  
forcing, 87, 89

**H**

HALTIFERROR, 140  
 hardware catalog, 94  
 hardware fault tolerance (HFT), 127  
 HFT (hardware fault tolerance), 127  
 Hot Standby (HSBY), 15
 

- automatic swap, 27
- Maintenance Mode, 36
- run offline, 36
- run primary state, 36
- run standby state, 36
- Safety Mode, 36
- stop offline, 36

 HOURMIN, 146  
 HSB\_CMD, 148  
 HSB\_STS, 149  
 HSBY (Hot Standby)
 

- automatic swap, 27
- Maintenance Mode, 36
- run offline, 36
- run primary state, 36
- run standby state, 36
- Safety Mode, 36
- stop offline, 36

 HSBY\_REVERSEi, 150

**I**

IEC 61508
 

- Emergency Shutdown (ESD), 15
- ESD (Emergency Shutdown), 15
- Functional Safety, 124
- Safe state, 15
- Safety Integrity Level (SIL), 15
- SIL (Safety Integrity Level), 15

 IEC 61511
 

- Functional Safety for the process industry, 124

 IEC61508
 

- Functional Safety, 15

 INDEXOVF, 137  
 installation
 

- Unity Pro XLS, 77

 INTELMODE, 143  
 IOERR, 135

IOERRTSK, 136  
 IOEVTNB, 145

**K**

KEY\_SWITCH, 150

**L**

LOCIOERR, 140

**M**

Maintenance Mode, 23, 89
 

- Debug Mode, 90
- halt state, 90
- run state, 90

 MASTACT, 138  
 MASTCURRTIME, 145  
 MASTMAXTIME, 145  
 MASTMINTIME, 145  
 MASTPERIOD, 142  
 MAXREQNB, 151  
 mean time between failures (MTBF), 130  
 MONTHDAY, 146  
 MSGCNT0, 151  
 MSGCNT1, 151  
 MSTSERVCNT, 151  
 MTBF (mean time between failures), 130

**O**

OSCOMMPATCH, 143  
 OSCOMMVERS, 143  
 OSINTVERS, 143  
 OVERFLOW, 136  
 OVERRUN, 136

**P**

PCMCIBAT0, 139  
 PCMCIBAT1, 139  
 PFD (probability of failure on demand), 17, 20  
 PFD (probability of failure on demand), 127  
 PFH (probability of failure per hour), 17, 20,

127  
PLC (programmable logic controller), 15  
PLC cycle time, 71  
PLC reaction time, 71  
PLCBAT, 139  
PLCRUNNING, 135  
probability of failure on demand (PFD), 17, 20, 127  
probability of failure per hour (PFH), 17, 20, 127  
process Safety time (PST), 34, 71  
programmable logic controller (PLC), 15  
proof test interval (PTI), 17, 22  
PST (process Safety time), 34, 71  
PTI (proof test interval), 17, 22  
pulse test, 50

## Q

Quantum Safety CPU  
    internal 1oo2 architecture, 33  
Quantum Safety I/O, 39, 55

## R

REMIOERR, 140  
remote I/O (RIO), 39, 55  
RIO (remote I/O), 39, 55  
RSTMSGCNT, 140  
RTCERR, 138  
RTCTUNING, 139  
RTCWRITE, 138

## S

safe failure fraction (SFF), 127  
Safety FFB (Safety function/function block), 79  
Safety FFB library, 79, 94  
Safety function/function block (Safety FFB), 79  
Safety Integrity Level (SIL), 126  
Safety loop, 20, 129  
Safety memory area, 101, 101

Safety Mode, 23, 87  
    error state, 87  
    run state, 87  
Safety move function block, 103  
SAVECURRVAL, 140  
SEC, 146  
Security Editor, 78  
SFF (safe failure fraction), 127  
SIL, 17  
SIL (Safety Integrity Level), 126  
STOPDAY, 147  
STOPHM, 147  
STOPMD, 147  
STOPSEC, 147  
STOPYEAR, 147  
STRINGERROR, 136

## T

TB100MS, 134  
TB10MS, 134  
TB1MIN, 134  
TB1SEC, 134  
time-out state, 51  
TIMEREVTNB, 150  
TSKINHIBIN, 142  
TSKINHIBOUT, 142  
TSKINIT, 142

## U

UMA (unrestricted memory area), 101  
Unity Pro OSLoader, 22  
Unity Pro XLS  
    installation, 77  
    self-test, 94  
unrestricted memory area, 101  
unrestricted memory area (UMA), 101

## V

version stamp, 96



## **W**

warm start, *25*  
WARMSTART, *134*  
watchdog, *34*  
WDG, *135*  
WDGVALUE, *142*  
WEEKOFYEAR, *150*  
write protection, *101*

## **Y**

YEAR, *146*

